Self-punishment and Internalization of Social Norms:

The Mind Following Norms

Abstract

Self-sanction in the repeated norm enforcing game is analyzed in order to analyze norm internalization of rational actors. Self-sanction is costly punishment which is carried out to self and includes psychological (e.g. conscience and regret), economic (resigning a job), and physical (hurting self) processes. The norm with self-punishment strategy equilibrium is characterized, and both self-sanction and external-sanction which is carried out by other players are considered. The equilibrium is sustained even when the social norm brings inefficient outcome. We obtained following results. Firstly, the equilibrium is sustained in wider setting of parameters when self-sanction is planned. Secondly, social norm in N-prisoners’ dilemma setting can be sustained without external-sanction. Lastly, key mechanism sustaining inefficient norms is not self-sanction but external one.