Abstract
‘Problem of Order’ is one of the basic problems in sociology. It has two aspects, ‘emergence problem of order’ and ‘stability problem of order’. No theory has given persuading explanation about how the order emerges.
We treat the emergence problem of order as the problem of emergence of cooperation in social dilemma. In repeated 2-person prisoner's dilemma, players can cooperate with ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy. But in n-person prisoner's dilemma, ‘tit-for-tat’ cannot achieve cooperation.
Axelrod's ‘Metanorm game’ is a prospective approach to NPD. In metanorm game, betrayal is punished, and not punishing betrayal is also punished by other members. Axelrod simulated metanorm game 5 times by evolutional technic (high score strategies increase), and every run achieved the cooperation. But in his simulations, initial strategies and mutation rate are fixed. So we change them and examine the possibility of emergence of order.
The results show that initial low vengefulness make it impossible to establish the order, and that the mutation rate changes the possibility of order establishment from the situation in which everyone betrays and nobody punishes. We conclude that evolutional simulation has many probability, treating the emergence problem of order, and social development.
