Rational Choice Theory of Democracy and Constitutionalism: Heresthetics and Contemporary Japanese Politics

Abstract

The Arrovian impossibility theorem disproves the existence of the general will and the stability of democratic politics. The result is detrimental to both the normative and the positive theory of democracy. In response, normative theorists try to reestablish the general will by stressing informational, deliberative, and reflexive effects associated with deliberative democracy, while positive theorists try to show democratic stability by analyzing agenda-setting institutions such as legislative committees.

　Contrastingly, Riker (1982, 1986) and McLean (2003) theorize political leaders' attempts at changing issue dimensions and realigning the majority coalition in pursuit of their policy agenda, the act referred to as "heresthetic." They apply the theory of heresthetic to reinterpreting major turning points in American and British political history.

　Despite the plethora of analytical elegance and historical insights, their studies give rise to the following questions: What would heresthetic politicians seek to accomplish, given democratic stability predicted by the normative and positive theories? How could they keep stability against change of governments with varying values and interests?

　This article tries to provide answers to the questions by analyzing the dilemma between democracy and constitutionalism. In addition, it tries to account for instability and leadership's weakness that inhere in contemporary Japanese politics.