Legislative Productivity of Japanese Local Governments

Abstract

Numerous researchers have studied the determinants of legislative productivity of a government. However, previous studies have primarily focused on two cases: (1) the U.S. Congress that is dominated by two-party system under presidentialism and (2) European parliaments that include multiparty system under parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. Thus, the central research interest has focused on their institutional settings. In that sense, the theory and evidence of the previous studies need to be tested further in other contexts.

　In this study, using the panel data of 47 Japanese prefectures from 1967 to 2006, we examine the generalizability of such an existing theory on legislative productivity. Local Japanese politics could be a good example of the unique institutional combination of a presidential system and one-party dominant system. Thus, we observe that the seat share of governors'par ties in an assembly increases the passage rate of governors'bills, while the effective number of governors'parties as a partisan veto player decreases the number of new local government ordinances. The results support a partial generalizability of the existing theory in the context of local Japanese politics.