Philosophy (Tetsugaku)
Online ISSN : 1884-2380
Print ISSN : 0387-3358
ISSN-L : 0387-3358
Why Hegel Changed the Position in his System of The Phenomenology of Spirit
Yusuke IIZUMI
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2019 Volume 2019 Issue 70 Pages 145-159

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Abstract

In this paper, I raise a fundamental question about Hegelian philosophy: why did Hegel change the systematical position of The Phenomenology of Spirit? I also try to answer that question by considering the work’s philosophical task. Contrary to the dominant interpretation in contemporary studies of Hegel’s work, I emphasize that the Phenomenology’s task is to justify the genesis of his philosophy as a “System of Science” by describing the historical development of the Spirit. This interpretation foregrounds Hegel’s ambivalent view of the foundation of philosophy, which relates to its historical condition, but which occurs “here and now”.

Hegel published the Phenomenology in 1807 under the title “System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit” but he soon excluded it from the whole system. Instead, “The Science of Logic” became the first section. There are now two major perspectives on this disputed point. One is based on the object of the Phenomenology, i.e., Consciousness. The other focuses on the significance of its role or task to “introduce non-scientific consciousness into Science.” Although the former neglects the characteristics of a systematic philosophy, the latter is insufficient for explaining the reason for the change Hegel made. So, considering Hegel’s idea of the “Need of Philosophy” in his early Jena period, I point out that the most important task of the Phenomenology must be to describe the movement of the Spirit, which realizes itself historically and knows itself in Science. My analysis of the Religion chapter and the Absolute Knowing chapter in the Phenomenology also makes the crucial point of this development clear; the Spirit, which develops in historical time and which, at last, knows itself as ahistorical absolute Knowing, “annihilates” time. This is why it would be possible to describe its historical development only once as presented in the Phenomenology, and why Hegel has no option but to exclude it from his philosophical system.

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© 2019 The Philosophical Association of Japan
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