Intentionality and Sensation

Abstract

Most of the discussions concerning the nature of perception take for granted the distinction between perception and sensation, and regard the latter as a part or a necessary condition of the former. This assumption will take two different forms in its application, in accordance with the qualifications which may be given to 'sensation'. According to one version of the doctrine, perception involves some direct awareness, i. e. some non-inferential and incorrigible apprehension of particular matter of fact. In the other interpretation, sensation as 'event' or 'occurrence' comes to the fore instead of 'sensing' or its objective correlate ('sensedatum'). Sensation occurs, they contend, as an internal event caused by some physical or physiological processes, irrespective of its becoming an object of direct apprehension.
Despite its apparent conspicuity, the official doctrine of perception gives rise to many philosophical perplexities. The present paper is an attempt to expose the difficulties contained in its two versions, and, through this criticism, to reach another theory exempted from those difficulties. In the second part of this paper, I tried to outline a theory of perception based on the notion of 'intentionality'. Perceiving should be regarded as a kind of knowing, on account of its propositional claim. I discussed there on the nature of 'perceptual evidence' and of 'descriptive content in perception' at some length, because these are, I believe, the very points concerning which my position may be clearly marked off from the two rival theories-Phenomenalism and Causal Theory.