The Indeterminacy of Translation and the Anomalism of Mental Properties

Abstract

Quine asserted that the indeterminacy of translation differed qualitatively from the underdetermination of scientific theory. But Chomsky called this doctrine in question, because he thought that there were no reasons to distinguish linguistics (or psychology) in principle from natural science. I think that the disagreement between Quine and Chomsky is derived from the difference in the viewpoint on whether the mental has reality or not. Then I consider in this paper this doctrine without referring to ontological position of the mental, because of which their dispute has been complicated. In order to guide such a consideration to success, I make use of Davidson's doctrine of the anomalism of the mental. I conclude that the indeterminacy of translation is different from the underdetermination of scientific theory, for translating (or interpreting) others' utterances is distinguished from constructing theories in natural science from a methodological point of view.