Two Conceptions of “Rationality”
A Critique of J. McDowellian Versions of “moral realism”
1999 Volume 1999 Issue 50 Pages 61-73
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1999 Volume 1999 Issue 50 Pages 61-73
Required that moral should be justified, one could say this consists in its being rational. In contemporary moral philosophy, however, two fundamentally different conceptions of rationality prevail : one is that of “moral realism” advocated by J. McDowell and others, and the other is that of “non-cognitivism” or “projectivism.” Between these two theories lies, I think, the difference in the view of morality. For the former morality is a practice in itself, and that as such as to make life meaningful; for the latter it is something that (as a means) regulates practices (in social relations) so as to make life well.
