表現の意味、真理条件、解釈の関係をめぐって 言語哲学の回顧と展望

西山 佑司

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.113

Linguistic Meaning, Truth-conditions, and Utterance Interpretation

Yuji NISHIYAMA

Author information

JOURNAL FREE ACCESS

2005 Volume 2005 Issue 56 Pages 113-129,6

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2005.113

Details

Published: April 01, 2005 Received: - Available on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009 Accepted: - Advance online publication: - Revised: -
Correction information
Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: ABSTRACT Details: Wrong : The present paper considers the adequacy of an essential assumption in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is that linguistic meaning is to be understood in referential/logical terms and that semantics is inherently truth conditional. Frege origi-nated this assumption. He defined Sinn (sense) as the determiner of Bedeutung (reference) . In contrast, linguistic semantics developed within the framework of the generative theory of grammar has no commitment to Frege's reference determining definition of sense. It defines sense as the determiner of sense properties and relations such as ambiguity, synonymy, analyticity, and entailment. Quine's argument that these sense properties and relations cannot be made objective sense of is critically reviewed.
We claim that linguistic semantics is not truth conditional. Truth conditions are to be assigned to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which is captured by the theory of utterance interpretation, i.e., inferential pragmatics.
Particular attention is paid to Yamada's argument that the content of illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, and the like cannot be identified with propositions. We claim that Yamada's argument is not convincing. We also comment on his idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which generalizes Austin's theory of truth.
Right : The present paper considers the adequacy of an essential assumption in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is that linguistic meaning is to be understood in referential/logical terms and that semantics is inherently truth conditional. Frege origi-nated this assumption. He defined Sinn (sense) as the determiner of Bedeutung (reference) . In contrast, linguistic semantics developed within the framework of the generative theory of grammar has no commitment to Frege's reference determining definition of sense. It defines sense as the determiner of sense properties and relations such as ambiguity, synonymy, analyticity, and entailment. Quine's argument that these sense properties and relations cannot be made objective sense of is critically reviewed.
We claim that linguistic semantics is not truth conditional. Truth conditions are to be assigned to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which is captured by the theory of utterance interpretation, i.e., inferential pragmatics.
Particular attention is paid to Yamada's argument that the content of illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, and the like cannot be identified with propositions. We claim that Yamada's argument is not convincing. We also comment on his idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which generalizes Austin's theory of truth.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: CITATION Details: Wrong : Carston, Robyn (2002) Tbougbts and Utterances, Oxford: Blackwell.
Donnellan, Keith (1966) "Reference and Descriptions," Pbilosopbical Review 75 : 281-304.
Higginbotham, James (1988) "Contexts, Models, and Meanings," Ruth Kempson (ed.) Mental Representations., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katz, Jerrold (1972) Semantic Theory, New York : Harper & Row.
Katz, Jerrold (1990) The Metaphysics of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Katz, Jerrold (1992) "The New Intensionalism," Mind 101: 1-31.
Katz, Jerrold (1998) Realistic Rationalism, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Lewis, David (1972) "General Semantics," in D. Davidson & G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht : D. Reidel.

Right : Carston, Robyn (2002) Tbougbts and Utterances, Oxford: Blackwell.
Donnellan, Keith (1966) "Reference and Descriptions," Pbilosopbical Review 75 : 281-304.
Higginbotham, James (1988) "Contexts, Models, and Meanings," Ruth Kempson (ed.) Mental Representations., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katz, Jerrold (1972) Semantic Theory, New York : Harper & Row.
Katz, Jerrold (1990) The Metaphysics of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Katz, Jerrold (1992) "The New Intensionalism," Mind 101: 1-31.
Katz, Jerrold (1998) Realistic Rationalism, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Lewis, David (1972) "General Semantics," in D. Davidson & G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht : D. Reidel.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: PDF FILE Details: -

Abstract

The present paper considers the adequacy of an essential assumption in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is that linguistic meaning is to be understood in referential/logical terms and that semantics is inherently truth conditional. Frege origi-nated this assumption. He defined Sinn (sense) as the determiner of Bedeutung (reference) . In contrast, linguistic semantics developed within the framework of the generative theory of grammar has no commitment to Frege's reference determining definition of sense. It defines sense as the determiner of sense properties and relations such as ambiguity, synonymy, analyticity, and entailment. Quine's argument that these sense properties and relations cannot be made objective sense of is critically reviewed.
We claim that linguistic semantics is not truth conditional. Truth conditions are to be assigned to the proposition expressed by an utterance, which is captured by the theory of utterance interpretation, i.e., inferential pragmatics.
Particular attention is paid to Yamada's argument that the content of illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, and the like cannot be identified with propositions. We claim that Yamada's argument is not convincing. We also comment on his idea of a general theory of content for illocutionary acts which generalizes Austin's theory of truth.

Corresponding author

Correction information

Register with J-STAGE for free!