A modal symbol systems and meaning theory

Abstract

According to a principle of analytic philosophy and of cognitive science since the decline of behaviorism, amodal symbols must be used in representation systems implemented by the nervous systems of higher organisms. Amodal symbols don't carry any intrinsic content in themselves, and are arbitrarily related to represented properties. Philosophers and cognitive scientists are therefore obliged to explain what it is for symbols to have content, and how symbols obtain their contents. Meaning theories, in which these necessary explanations should be given, are needed urgently. There are many proposals for meaning theories, but astonishingly, they are all based on the same general idea that can be called the theory of use. According to this theory, semantic relations between symbols and represented properties come about by application of symbols to their target properties, and are fixed by use of the symbols as representatives of these properties in representation systems. From the theory of use follow, however, serious theoretical problems-eliminative materialism in semantic holism and the problem of direct transduction in semantic atomism. These problems show that the amodality of mental symbols is not a good starting place for theorizing about mental representation in a natural way.