Abstract
Practical reasoning is deliberation about what to do. In order to figure out the best thing for her to do, the agent weighs both the reasons for and against a particular course of action and finally forms the judgment: "All things considered, I should do x". In cases of akrasia, however, the agent curiously fails to abide by this best judgment. She freely and intentionally does something that she knows well, at the time of action, to be worse than the best alternative. What is the meaning of this irrational, self-destructive action? How can it be even possible?
The chief aim of this paper is to explain how we can act freely against our best judgment, but this task will also lead us to see the significance of akrasia for the contemporary philosophy of action. The significance of akrasia, I shall argue, lies in the fact that it reveals the other crucial determinants of our actions than practical reasoning, the importance of which has not yet been fully recognized and emphasized in the philosophy of action.
