Leibniz on the Ontological Status of Bodies

Seishu NISHIMURA

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2007.1

Seishu NISHIMURA

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2007 Volume 2007 Issue 58 Pages 1-29

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2007.1

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Published: April 01, 2007 Received: - Available on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009 Accepted: - Advance online publication: - Revised: -
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Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: ABSTRACT Details: Wrong : In his late metaphysics, beginning about 1686, Leibniz characterizes the ontological status of bodies in two different ways: bodies are seen as phenomena and, at the same time, they are treated as aggregates of monads. There are two kinds of interpretations necessary for consistent understanding of these characterizations. One is a phenomenalistic interpretation which reduces bodies into sets of perceptual appearances. The other is a realist interpretation which grounds the reality of bodies on that of the aggregates of monads.
My aim in this paper is to support the realist interpretation through the elucidation of Leibniz's theory of perception. This aim is attained in three steps. The first step is to clarify Leibniz's theory of ideas in comparison with Antoine Arnauld. There is a similarity between these philosophers concerning the way they understand the nature of ideas, which leads their theories of ideas to a kind of direct realism that does not postulate any real entities between a perceiving mind and its external objects. This suggests that, in Leibniz's theory of perception, a monad is not directed towards phenomena as appearances, but towards bodies defined as aggregates of monads. The second step is to elucidate Leibniz's theory of expression, by showing that this theory is consistent with my direct realist interpretation. The last step is to examine one passage by Leibniz which seems inconsistent with my interpretation, and to resolve this apparent contradiction.
Right : In his late metaphysics, beginning about 1686, Leibniz characterizes the ontological status of bodies in two different ways: bodies are seen as phenomena and, at the same time, they are treated as aggregates of monads. There are two kinds of interpretations necessary for consistent understanding of these characterizations. One is a phenomenalistic interpretation which reduces bodies into sets of perceptual appearances. The other is a realist interpretation which grounds the reality of bodies on that of the aggregates of monads.
My aim in this paper is to support the realist interpretation through the elucidation of Leibniz's theory of perception. This aim is attained in three steps. The first step is to clarify Leibniz's theory of ideas in comparison with Antoine Arnauld. There is a similarity between these philosophers concerning the way they understand the nature of ideas, which leads their theories of ideas to a kind of direct realism that does not postulate any real entities between a perceiving mind and its external objects. This suggests that, in Leibniz's theory of perception, a monad is not directed towards phenomena as appearances, but towards bodies defined as aggregates of monads. The second step is to elucidate Leibniz's theory of expression, by showing that this theory is consistent with my direct realist interpretation. The last step is to examine one passage by Leibniz which seems inconsistent with my interpretation, and to resolve this apparent contradiction.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: PDF FILE Details: -

Abstract

In his late metaphysics, beginning about 1686, Leibniz characterizes the ontological status of bodies in two different ways: bodies are seen as phenomena and, at the same time, they are treated as aggregates of monads. There are two kinds of interpretations necessary for consistent understanding of these characterizations. One is a phenomenalistic interpretation which reduces bodies into sets of perceptual appearances. The other is a realist interpretation which grounds the reality of bodies on that of the aggregates of monads.
My aim in this paper is to support the realist interpretation through the elucidation of Leibniz's theory of perception. This aim is attained in three steps. The first step is to clarify Leibniz's theory of ideas in comparison with Antoine Arnauld. There is a similarity between these philosophers concerning the way they understand the nature of ideas, which leads their theories of ideas to a kind of direct realism that does not postulate any real entities between a perceiving mind and its external objects. This suggests that, in Leibniz's theory of perception, a monad is not directed towards phenomena as appearances, but towards bodies defined as aggregates of monads. The second step is to elucidate Leibniz's theory of expression, by showing that this theory is consistent with my direct realist interpretation. The last step is to examine one passage by Leibniz which seems inconsistent with my interpretation, and to resolve this apparent contradiction.

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