ソクラテスと無知の「思い」 プラトン『カルミデス』の「思慮とは何か」という問い

波多野 知子

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2007.237

Socrates and the Opinion of One's Own Ignorance

Tomoko HATANO

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2007 Volume 2007 Issue 58 Pages 237-252,26

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2007.237

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Published: April 01, 2007 Received: - Available on J-STAGE: July 23, 2009 Accepted: - Advance online publication: - Revised: -
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Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: ABSTRACT Details: Wrong : Intellectualism which regards virtue as knowledge and "knowledge of one's own ignorance" are generally characterized as Socratic philosophy described in the early dialogues. Socrates in the Charmides searches after what is prudence (sophrosune), and fails in his inquiry. Most commentators of the dialogue have premised Socratic intellectualism or "knowledge of his own ignorance", or rather, they have never denied the premise. Plato, however, does not write all his works in the same way.
I think it is necessary to consider the stage settings Plato carefully prepares and the nature of the question of what is sophrosune. My interpretation shows an answer to the question of what is sophrosune, which also denies the mark uniform in the early dialogues, that is, Socratic intellectualism and "knowledge of his own ignorance".
Socrates is described as being quite beside himself when seeing the beauty of Char-mides. He does not know himself and does not embody self-knowledge. The question of what is sophrosune demands not knowledge but opinion (doxa). "Ignorance of one's own ignorance", "knowledge of one's own ignorance", and "opinion of one's own ignorance" are different one another. It is opinion that one does not know what one does not know that the dialogue suggests as sophrosune.
Right : Intellectualism which regards virtue as knowledge and "knowledge of one's own ignorance" are generally characterized as Socratic philosophy described in the early dialogues. Socrates in the Charmides searches after what is prudence (sophrosune), and fails in his inquiry. Most commentators of the dialogue have premised Socratic intellectualism or "knowledge of his own ignorance", or rather, they have never denied the premise. Plato, however, does not write all his works in the same way.
I think it is necessary to consider the stage settings Plato carefully prepares and the nature of the question of what is sophrosune. My interpretation shows an answer to the question of what is sophrosune, which also denies the mark uniform in the early dialogues, that is, Socratic intellectualism and "knowledge of his own ignorance".
Socrates is described as being quite beside himself when seeing the beauty of Char-mides. He does not know himself and does not embody self-knowledge. The question of what is sophrosune demands not knowledge but opinion (doxa). "Ignorance of one's own ignorance", "knowledge of one's own ignorance", and "opinion of one's own ignorance" are different one another. It is opinion that one does not know what one does not know that the dialogue suggests as sophrosune.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: CITATION Details: Wrong : Brisson, L., L'incantation de Zalmoxis dans le Charmide (156d-157c), Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum Selected Papers, International Plato Studies, vol. 13. ed. by Robinson T. M. and Brisson L., Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2000, 278-286.
Dyson, M., Some Problems concerning Knowledge in Plato's "Charmides", Pronesis 19 (1974), 102-111.
Griswold, C. L., Unifying Plato, The Journal of Philosophy 85(1988), 550-551.
Halper, E., Is Knowledge of Knowledge Possible?: Charmides 167a-169d, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 309-316.
Kahn, C. H., Plato's Charmides and the proleptic Reading of Socrtatic Dialogues, The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 541-549.
Kosman, L. A., Charmides' First Definition: Sophrosyne as Quietness, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 2 (1983), 203-216.
Mahoney, T. A., The Charmides: Socratic Sophrosune, Human Sophrosune, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996), 183-199.
McAvoy, M., Carnal Knowledge in the Charmides, Apeiron 29 (1996), 63-103.
Murphy, D.J., Doctors of Zalmoxis and Immortality in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 287-295
Notomi, N., Critias and the Origin of Plato's Political Philosophy, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 237-250.
North, H., Sophrosyne; Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1966.
Reece, A., Drama, Narrative, and Socratic Eros in Plato's Charmides, Interpretation 26 (1998), 65-76.
Santas, G., Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Charmides, Phronesis, Supplementary Volume 1 (1973), 105-132.
Schmid, W. T., Socrates' Practice of Elenchus in the Charmides, Ancient Philosophy 1 (1981), 141-147.
Schmid, W. T., Socratic Moderation and Self-Knowledge, Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983), 339-348.
Solere-Queval, S., Lecture du Charmide, Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 11 (no.1)(1993), 3-65.
Sprague, R. K., The Charmides, Plato's Pbilosopber-King, Columbia, U. of Souty Carolina Press, 1976. 29-42
Stalley, R. F., Spohrosune in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 265-277.
Tarrant, H., Naming Interrogation in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 251-258.
Tuckey, T. G., Plato's Charmides, Amsterdam, 1968.
Tuozzo, T. M., Greetings from Apollo: Charmides 164c-165b, Epistle III, and the Structure of the Charmide, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 296-305
Vallejo, A., Maieutic, epoide and myth in the Socratic dialogues, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 324-336
Wellman, R. R., The Question Posed at Charmides 165a-166c. Phronesis 9 (1964), 107-113.

Right : Brisson, L., L'incantation de Zalmoxis dans le Charmide (156d-157c), Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum Selected Papers, International Plato Studies, vol. 13. ed. by Robinson T. M. and Brisson L., Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2000, 278-286.
Dyson, M., Some Problems concerning Knowledge in Plato's "Charmides", Pronesis 19 (1974), 102-111.
Griswold, C. L., Unifying Plato, The Journal of Philosophy 85(1988), 550-551.
Halper, E., Is Knowledge of Knowledge Possible?: Charmides 167a-169d, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 309-316.
Kahn, C. H., Plato's Charmides and the proleptic Reading of Socrtatic Dialogues, The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 541-549.
Kosman, L. A., Charmides' First Definition: Sophrosyne as Quietness, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 2 (1983), 203-216.
Mahoney, T. A., The Charmides: Socratic Sophrosune, Human Sophrosune, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996), 183-199.
McAvoy, M., Carnal Knowledge in the Charmides, Apeiron 29 (1996), 63-103.
Murphy, D.J., Doctors of Zalmoxis and Immortality in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 287-295
Notomi, N., Critias and the Origin of Plato's Political Philosophy, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 237-250.
North, H., Sophrosyne; Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1966.
Reece, A., Drama, Narrative, and Socratic Eros in Plato's Charmides, Interpretation 26 (1998), 65-76.
Santas, G., Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Charmides, Phronesis, Supplementary Volume 1 (1973), 105-132.
Schmid, W. T., Socrates' Practice of Elenchus in the Charmides, Ancient Philosophy 1 (1981), 141-147.
Schmid, W. T., Socratic Moderation and Self-Knowledge, Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983), 339-348.
Solere-Queval, S., Lecture du Charmide, Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 11 (no.1)(1993), 3-65.
Sprague, R. K., The Charmides, Plato's Pbilosopber-King, Columbia, U. of Souty Carolina Press, 1976. 29-42
Stalley, R. F., Spohrosune in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 265-277.
Tarrant, H., Naming Interrogation in the Charmides, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 251-258.
Tuckey, T. G., Plato's Charmides, Amsterdam, 1968.
Tuozzo, T. M., Greetings from Apollo: Charmides 164c-165b, Epistle III, and the Structure of the Charmide, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 296-305
Vallejo, A., Maieutic, epoide and myth in the Socratic dialogues, in Brisson and Robinson, 2000, 324-336
Wellman, R. R., The Question Posed at Charmides 165a-166c. Phronesis 9 (1964), 107-113.

Date of correction: July 23, 2009 Reason for correction: - Correction: PDF FILE Details: -

Abstract

Intellectualism which regards virtue as knowledge and "knowledge of one's own ignorance" are generally characterized as Socratic philosophy described in the early dialogues. Socrates in the Charmides searches after what is prudence (sophrosune), and fails in his inquiry. Most commentators of the dialogue have premised Socratic intellectualism or "knowledge of his own ignorance", or rather, they have never denied the premise. Plato, however, does not write all his works in the same way.
I think it is necessary to consider the stage settings Plato carefully prepares and the nature of the question of what is sophrosune. My interpretation shows an answer to the question of what is sophrosune, which also denies the mark uniform in the early dialogues, that is, Socratic intellectualism and "knowledge of his own ignorance".
Socrates is described as being quite beside himself when seeing the beauty of Char-mides. He does not know himself and does not embody self-knowledge. The question of what is sophrosune demands not knowledge but opinion (doxa). "Ignorance of one's own ignorance", "knowledge of one's own ignorance", and "opinion of one's own ignorance" are different one another. It is opinion that one does not know what one does not know that the dialogue suggests as sophrosune.

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