Abstract
Constructivism can usefully be seen as a view about normativity. It denies both that normativity is a constraint based on a fact which is prior to and independent of our stance (realism), and also that it is a merely causation originating in our conative attitudes (noncognitivism). It takes normativity to be a requirement which is derived from our rational choices and which is constructed by our practical reason. On this constructivist view, it becomes clear that normativity is constitutive of those who ‘are agents who make choices and judgments on the basis of reasons’. In this article, by examining moral judgments about the good from the viewpoint of Korsgaard's constructivism, I consider how it explains the normativity of moral value, and how it presents a possible means of dissolving the controversy between realism and non-cognitivism about moral value. First of all, I clearly specify what it is to be constructivist (sec. 2). Secondly, through examining a constructivist criticism of realism (sec. 3-4) and the rationalist theory about the good which constructivism advocates (sec. 5), I show that an important feature of the constructivist account of the normativity of moral value is that it emphasizes the procedure of making moral judgments in the light of our multiple agency. Thirdly, I set out what it is to be a reason-a concept which constructivism presupposes (sec. 6). Lastly, I reply to some objections to constructivism (sec. 7). In this article, I particularly take up G. E. Moore's realism and investigate onstructivism's explanation of normativity by contrast with this.
