Abstract
This paper offers an eclectic version of utilitarianism that is better suited for applied contexts than more familiar versions of utilitarianism. This version of utilitarianism, called unsettled-domain utilitarianism (UDU), is based on Hare's two-level theory, but the role of the critical level is significantly downplayed. In Hare's version, utilitarian critical thinking is used for choosing intuitive moral rules, but according to UDU, a utilitarian calculation should not be used to evaluate existing moral intuitions or to decide which intuitions to have.
UDU divides moral issues into two domains, namely the settled domain and the unsettled domain. The settled domain is the domain of situations and problems that can be dealt with by following existing moral rules, and the unsettled domain is the domain of situations and problems that cannot be solved by following existing rules. UDU respects the existing moral rules in the former domain, while it adopts utilitarian thinking in the latter. There are few alternatives anyway in this latter domain.
There are several expected objections to this position, and the latter half of this paper addresses these. To meet the criticism that UDU is too conservative, I distinguish between heuristic and justificatory contexts, and emphasize that a conservative approach is necessary in a justificatory context. I also argue that demarcating the boundary between the settled and unsettled domains is not a serious problem for UDU. To the criticism that UDU is too relativistic, I argue that even though UDU can be classified as a version of relativism, it does not have relativism's undesirable features. I conclude that UDU is a promising alternative, definitely more promising than it may seem at first glance.
