Abstract

In order to improve the quality of public policy, we need to analyze not only policy contents, but also political systems. We must investigate how to design political systems. From this point of view, public choice theory seems a very useful clue for us, because it offers a consistent model of institutional design. According to this theory, “political market” is essentially inefficient because of its institutional nature. So we need some constraints on it, especially constitutional rules. We can suppress inefficient policy outputs by those constraints. However, we find some problems in this theory. First, “political market” may not be so inefficient as public choice theorists insist. Second, those constraints may bring some secondary social costs. For example, vested interests could be more influential because those constraints would decrease influence of general people too. Or they might increase burden for courts because many political groups would step into courts to realize their claims. Third, and most significantly, public choice theory does not pay attention to political values, especially participation and deliberation. We must consider political values for designing political systems because they will improve public policy greatly. We can refine and launder our preferences through participation and deliberation.