2000 Volume 2000 Pages 2000-1-029-
This paper argues that these policy changes by the Environmental Agency can be explained by Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the Environmental Agency. POS is devised by sociologist to explain social movement influence, but this paper analyzes the Environmental Agency’s POS. The POS emphasizes how and when the Environmental Agency acquires resources external to one. It consists of three components: (1) unity between MITI and business circles, (2) the role of parties, (3) the possibility of alliance. The opening in POS supports the Environmental Agency to establish new environmental policies.
This hypothesis is proved by a case study of decision–making process of an environmental assessment bill in 1997. The Environmental Agency failed to legislate for an environmental assessment from 1973 to 1982. But environmental bureaucrats succeeded in passing the environmental assessment bill in 1997. Why? First, Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic organizations) and Denki–Jigyo–Rengou–Kai (The Federation of Electric Power Companies) opposed MITI which attempted to draw up an environmental assessment bill for itself(unity between MITI and economic circles). Second, the Ministry of Construction gave support to the environmental assessment bill drew up by the Environmental Agency, and actually aligned with environmental bureaucrats (the possibility of alliance). Third, prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who had been interested in environmental problems, provided his political leadership for the Environmental Agency’s bill, and settled the battle over turf between MITI and the Environmental Agency (the role of parties). Fourth, a coalition cabinet, which was consisted of by Liberal Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party and Sakigake, regarded the Environmental Agency’s bill as glue for strengthening the party coalition, and approved the bill (the role of parties).