Centralization of Policy Formulation Process and Executive-Legislative Relations: Evidence from Local Governments in Japan

Abstract

In order to lead policy formulation, modern chief executives often centralize the policy formulation process in the bureaucracy. This paper asks the remaining questions in previous studies on centralization: (1) to what extent do the chief executives centralize/decentralize depending on the size of their pre-electoral coalitions, and (2) how does centralization by the chief executives affect their legislative success. To address these questions, this paper selects Japanese local governments from 1991 to 2014 as a case. Studies on local governments in Japan have not yet answered these questions. Based on rational choice theory and quantitative analysis by the dataset on the bureaucratic organization of local governments created by the author, this paper reveals the following. First, the smaller the governors’ pre-electoral coalitions are, the more they centralize the policy formulation process. Second, the more governors centralize, the more their bills are amended or rejected. These results together suggest that the governors indirectly exert their influence on the assembly members by changing the extent of centralization as a reelection strategy according to the size of their pre-electoral coalitions. In other words, the policy formulation process is used by the governors as a political means of buildine a relationship with the assembly members, and the assembly members decide whether to accept the governors’ bills while considering not only their policy substance but also the extent of centralization.