The Significance of Hume’s Theory of “Abstract Ideas”:
The Epistemological Foundation of the General Point of View
2006 Volume 29 Pages 87-101
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2006 Volume 29 Pages 87-101
In the Treatise 1.1.7, “On Abstract Ideas”, Hume develops a significant criticism of the Lockean concept of “abstract ideas”. This paper contains three claims. The first claim is that the argument is to be read as providing a definition of Hume’s concept of “custom”. The second claim is that “resemblances” among things are not detected on the basis of any particular feature that is discovered by reason. And the third claim is that the “general point of view” that Hume employs in his discussion of moral assessments should be understood as the principle of custom. This paper, thus, is an attempt to find in Hume’s concept of custom a significant relationship between his epistemology and his moral theory.
