Abstract
In imperial China local administration was supported not by financial expenses but by various types of yaoyi 徭役 (compulsory labor) performed by the people. As part of this system during the Qing period dibao (地保) collected taxes and policed their areas. The nature of dibao was originally compulsory labor. Taxpayers were obliged to do their duties of labor in turn but ways of electing dibao were regionally different in Jiangnan. They were professionalized as one specific person's occupation in the most advanced regions-Suzhou-fu, Songjiang-fu and Taicang-zhou-, where on the one hand they were compeled to laogui (陋規, bribe) by shuyi (書役, officials at lower levels), while on the other hand they took bribes from taxpayers. In comparatively backward regions- Changzhou-fu and Zhenjiang-fu - the rotation system was kept. Through this system shuyi took bribes from dibao as representatives of taxpayers. From the 19th century local administrations began to suffer severe financial difficulties and bribes became a necessary means of financial support. In consequence, shuyi increasingly took bribes and the burden on dibao and taxpayers inrceased. In the Tongzhi era Ding Ri-chang, who was the governor of Jiangsu, tried to reform Iocal finances and prohibited the taking of bribes. Since the Daoguang era Bao Shi-chen, Feng Gui-fen and other intellectuals out of office had argued that it was necessary to establish a new post of officials, xiangguan 郷官, who would be appointed from local elites and assist the smaller units of the local administration. This idea was at last actualized in the Guangxu era. With the prohibition of bribery and the establishment of xiangguan, the system of dibao ended.
