Abstract
This paper analyses the current formation and effectiveness of the coalitions involved in the negotiation process of multilateral environmental agreements. This paper reviewed three cases, namely the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (focusing on the amendments to the 1996 Protocol to regulate the sequestration of CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes in sub-seabed geological formations), and the UN Environment Programme Ad-hoc Open Ended Working Group for the international management of mercury.
In these three cases, the Like-Minded group for international mercury management was regarded as an effective coalition i) to help coalition members prioritize targets within that group for the negotiation and clarification of the detailed design of a possible mercury treaty; and ii) to lead the formal negotiation by clearly stating the priorities. In contrast, the groups that did not share similar interests or that followed past negotiation processes served only as information exchange opportunities among member countries and did not contribute to the process of negotiations. This further suggests the possibility of obstructing the advancement of the negotiations by wasting human and financial resources.
