Does Rawlsian Theory Justify Workfare? : Theories of Justice and Social Policy Studies

Abstract

Since the collapse of the political consensus on the welfare state, the role of normative analysis in social policy studies has become more important. This article has two objectives: The first is to review how normative analysis applies to this area, and the second is to examine workfare using normative analysis. The main argument drawn from the former objective is that while introducing normative theories is the most popular approach to social policy studies, we should be cautious when using those developed by famous philosophers with regard to particular social policies. The examples in this paper show how theories by Amartya Sen, Robert Norzik and John Rawls are used. In particular, Rawls' advocacy of workfare is closely investigated, but I suggest that justifications for workfare, which are powerful and frequently expressed, are tautological and are based on moral judgments that are usually unspoken. This failure of actually existing discourses for workfare does not connote the impossibility of any justification for either actually existing workfare or fair (but not yet existing) workfare, neither position one which I would try to justify.