Autonomy and Epistemic Injustice

Abstract

This paper explored the interplay between autonomy and epistemic practices, drawing upon Catriona MacKenzie’s multidimensional conception of autonomy and Miranda Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice. Through this exploration, it becomes evident that epistemic injustice is a concept that largely overlaps with that of social recognition, one of the key requirements for autonomy Mackenzie includes within the dimension of self-authorization. It is also revealed that the harm caused by epistemic injustice extends not only to the dimension of self-authorization but also self-governance. This underscores the importance of considering measures to safeguard autonomy from an epistemological perspective. This paper argues that Elizabeth Anderson’s proposal for institutional remedies against epistemic injustice offers valuable ideas that can be used as a guideline for such measures. It indicates that the integrative model of affirmative action （AA） constitutes a central part of her remedies and that there are four challenges in implementing this model : 1） achieving a consensus about the purpose of AA, 2） determining the contexts in which this model is applied, 3） addressing the problem of misrecognition produced by AA, and 4） exploring transformative remedies that are not conditional on education or employment.