Abstract
In this paper, I examine the problem of consent in the context of care. It is probable that many people think we should recognize self-determination on the part of a person in care. But this is not always self evident. Self-determination is only a part of “being.” Thus, if a person in care makes a decision that will lead to irreversible harm to their being, paternalism may be justified. Should we only recognize the “being” of the cared person? In principle, I think we should. But, the principle can be difficult to follow m specific cases such as that where the person in care is suffering unbearble pain from a terminal condition. In this case, we want to recognize voluntary euthanasia even though it results in harm to the being that is irreversible. This paper will not debate the merits and demerits of euthanasia, but in the context of care it is something that should at least be subject to consideration.
