Abstract
Banks play a critical role in corporate governance in many economies around the world. This paper empirically compares the activities of security analysts (i.e., analyst coverage, forecast accuracy and forecast agreement) between firms with and without close working relationships with their banks in order to gain insights into how bank-firm relationships affect the information environments for capital market investors. Close bank-firm relationships signal the banks' positive evaluation of the firms because the banks screen the firms before entering or extending the relationships. Further, during the relationships, the banks monitor these firms. Thus, capital market investors are less motivated to scrutinize the firms, thereby demand less information. Investigating Japanese firms, we document that security analysts' forecasts are less accurate and less agreed (i.e., more dispersed) for the firms with long-established relationships with banks. Likewise, analyst coverage, forecast accuracy and forecast agreement are all lower for the firms with a larger amount of loans (i.e., private debt). The associations between bank-firm relationships and security analyst activities hold after controlling for the potential correlated variables (i.e., capital market financing, performance volatility, financial distress, cross-holding).
