The Beginning of the Second Grain Provision Measures and the Change of Feed Policy in the Grain Year 1935/36

Abstract

The drought which attacked Germany in the first half in 1934 grew more intense as summer came near. The drought hit all the farm products, but particularly the damage of raw fodder and grain was huge. Therefore, the Nazi agricultural leaders held a serious anxiety about the stable supply of grain of bread-making quality in the grain year 1934/35, so in July 14 of 1934 they introduced the grain provision measures as emergency measures so as to restrict the consumption for feed of grain of bread-making quality, particularly rye with twofold uses. Its operation injured the close linkages of production in the livestock farmer's management and accelerated the shortage of concentrated feed further. This meant a loss of the private initative of livestock farmer. From the autumn to the outset in 1935 the supply of feed grain extremely dropped and the excessive speculation appeared. Embodying the antipathy of the peasantry, also the grain provision measures came to deadlock. Meanwhile the bottleneck of feed supply became cumulatively aggravated and consequently the unusual contraction of animal husbandry was brought out by the massive and indiscriminate slaughter of livestock. This was no other than the crisis of the peasantry. This situation was critical. Because it was necessary to mobilize them for realizing the national security of food. The Nazi agricultural leaders did not design to withdraw the grain provision measures, but they must put it into operation whose contents should guarantee the peasantry the private initiative and enable them to recover the close linkages of production. It was intended that denying the unilateral nature of the provision measures in the previous year, they preserved the basic framework of the system and made its application flexible, which implied the concession towards the peasantry. Thus, the systematization of feed policy was needed so as to adjust the relation between demand and supply. Taking the above into account, this paper examines the institutional changes in the second grain provision measures and the transformation of feed policy which inevitably resulted from it.