introduction
Bhāviveka’s Concept of Prajñā in the Context of the Two Truths
2017 Volume 18.19 Pages 47-58
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2017 Volume 18.19 Pages 47-58
In analyzing Bhāviveka’s discussions of the two truths found in Ch. 3 of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (MHK) as well as his two other authentic works, the Prajñāpradīpa (PP) Ch. 24 and the *Hastaratna (大乗掌珍論; HR), it is no doubt crucial for us to consider what role the concept prajñā, or “intellect”, plays in them. In the first thirteen verses of MHK Ch. 3, the concept is used in the same sense as mati, buddhi and dhī, and intellect (prajñā) or intelligence (mati) is held to be of two kinds in relation to the two truths.
The present paper deals with the following three points: First, what is the difference between Vasubandhu and Bhāviveka’s usages of prajñā in the context of the two truths in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) Ch. 1 and MHK Ch. 3, respectively? Second, in this regard, what sense does Bhāviveka have in mind when he uses the same term in PP Ch. 24 (*śrutacintābhāvanāmayī prajñā or “intellect derived from learning, reflection, and meditation”) when discussing one of the three understandings (Bahuvrīhi) of the compound paramārtha? Third, in what sense can we then understand the title of his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Prajñāpradīpa?
First, let us turn to the third question, the meaning of the title of Bhāviveka’s commentary, Prajñāpradīpa. Although Bhāviveka provides no direct clues for understanding the meaning of this commentary’s title, the following verse of MHK 3.6 indicates his understanding of the usage and relationship of the words comprising it, prajñā and [pra]dīpa:
Intellect (prajñā) is the nectar that brings satisfaction, the lamp whose light is unobstructed, the steps on the palace of liberation, and the fire that burns the fuel of the defilements.
prajñā mṛtaṃ tṛptikaraṃ dīpo ’pratihataprabhaḥ/
mokṣaprāsādasopānaṃ kleśendhanahutāśanaḥ// (MHK 3.6) 1)
Bhavya, the author of the MHK commentary called Tarkajvārā (TJ), explains the above “intellect” (prajñā) as follows:
The intellect in question is [compared to] a lamp because it removes the darkness of ignorance (shes rab de nyid sgrom ma ste/ mi shes pa’i mun pa ’joms pa’i phyir ro// D Dza 54b7, P Dza 58a6-7).
According to the above verse, MHK 3.6, and Bhavya’s commentary on it, the intellect (prajñā) can be compared to a lamp to remove the darkness, steps to walk up, and fire that burns fuel. The darkness here is used as a metaphor for “ignorance”. Applying this explanation of “lamp” to the title of Prajñāpradīpa, we can understand the compound prajñā-pradīpa as a Karmadhāraya that means a “lamp-like intellect”, i.e., an intellect which removes ignorance (*ajñāna), just as a lamp removes darkness.
In order to make clear Bhaviveka’s usage and understanding of prajñā, let us turn here to my first question about the difference in Vasubandhu and Bhāviveka’s use of the concept in the context of the two truths. The following are Bhāviveka’s first twenty-two verses from his MHK, Ch. 3 titled “Inquiry into the Knowledge of Reality” (tattvajñānaiṣaṇā):
3.1. A person who has the eye of knowledge and not the other [eye] has a [true] eye. For this reason, a scholar should inquire into the knowledge of reality.
3.2. Even if a scholar is blind, he sees the three worlds without any obstruction; he sees whatever he wants to see, whether it is far away, subtle, or concealed.
3.3. Without understanding (buddhi), even [Indra] who has a thousand eyes is blind, because he does not see the right and wrong paths to heaven and liberation.
3.4. When he has opened the eye of intellect (prajñā), he does not practice [the perfection of] giving, etc., like thorns poisoned by desire for, visible or invisible, particular and favorite results.
3.5. He practices [the perfection of] giving, etc., pure in three ways, with compassion and for [the acquisition of] omniscience on which, however, his mind is not fixed.
3.6. Intellect is the nectar that brings satisfaction, the lamp whose light is unobstructed, the steps on the palace of liberation, and the fire that burns the fuel of the defilements.
3.7. It is accepted that there are two kinds of intelligence (mati) depending on the two truths since [intelligence] leads to the discernment of correct verbal convention (tathyasaṃvṛti) and real objects (bhūtārtha).
3.8-9. Conventional intellect (prajñā sāṃketikī) is known as being based on the twelve sense-fields in the following regard. It fulfills the prerequisites of giving, etc., merit and knowledge; it ascertains those causes, results, and the relation [between causes and results], along with the characteristics [of those prerequisites], etc.; and it sustains and matures sentient beings by practicing great compassion and pity.
3.10-11. Ultimate intellect (/insight) (prajñā pāramārthikī) enables us to negate the entire network of concepts, and it moves without moving into the clear sky of reality, which is peaceful, individually known, non-conceptual, non-verbal, and free from unity and diversity.
3.12-13. It is certainly impossible to climb up to the palace of reality without the steps of correct verbal convention. Therefore, one should first have a discerning mind by means of the conventional truth, and then ascertain the particular and universal characteristics (svasāmānyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas.
3.14. A scholar should practice concentration of the mind, and also knowledge derived from learning because it gives rise to the other knowledge [derived from reflection and meditation].
3.15-20. Omitted.
3.21-22. When the mind is concentrated, one should examine with intellect (prajñayā) in the following way: is the intrinsic nature of dharmas that is grasped conventionally (vyavahārataḥ) also grasped ultimately (paramārthataḥ) when it is examined with intelligence (dhiyā)? If so, then it is reality (tattva). If not, it should be investigated.
The following points are worth noting regarding Bhāviveka’s explanation of the role of prajñā or “intellect”:
First, the concept prajñā is an alternative for that of mati, buddhi, and dhī.
Second, the concept prajñā “intellect” or mati “intelligence” is of two kinds in relation to the two truths, viz., conventional and ultimate.
Third, at a glance, Bhāviveka’s usage of prajñā reminds us of Vasubandhu’s explanation of the meaning of abhidharma in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, in which he uses the same term prajñā in the context of the two truths.
Fourth, as will be later dealt with, because of their different understandings of the two truths, Bhāviveka and Vasubandhu differ in their usage of the concept prajñā in relation to the two truths.
Before analyzing Bhaviveka’s intention in using the concept prajñā, let us consider Vasubandhu’s usage of the same concept in the first chapter of AKBh 2).
“What is this “abhidharma”?
Abhidharma is an immaculate intellect (prajñā ) with its retinue.(2a)
In this [verse], “intellect” means the discernment of dharmas. “Immaculate [intellect]” means pure [intellect]. “With its retinue” means with its attendants. Thus, it is said that “abhidharma” consists of five pure aggregates. This is, first, the ultimate (pāramārthika) abhidharma.
On the other hand, the conventional (sāṃketika) one is:
The [intellect] for the acquisition of that [immaculate intellect] and also the treatise. (2b)
The impure intellect derived from learning, reflection and meditation or acquired by birth, along with its retinue [i.e., five aggregates], is also [the conventional abhidharma]. And the treatise for the acquisition of the pure intellect is also called “abhidharma” since it is a requisite for the [pure intellect].”
The intellect (prajñā) is traditionally regarded by the Sarvāstivāda school as one of the ten universal (mahābhūmika) mental-functions. Further, as the above explanation states, the intellect is of two kinds, pure (anāsrava) and impure. Also noteworthy is that the intellect, pure or impure, is therein defined as the discernment of dharmas, or (physical and mental) elements (dharmapravicaya). This interpretation of prajñā contrasts with that of Bhāviveka, who in the above MHK 3.10-13 states both that ascertainment of the particular and universal characteristics of dharmas is done by a discerning mind by means of the conventional truth, as well as that the ultimate intellect (prajñā pāramārthikī) enables us to negate the entire network of the world’s concepts.
IV-1 PP ad MMK 24.8
In his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā, *Avalokitavrata explains Bhāviveka’s comments on the two truths (dve satye) found in MMK 24.8. After having explained lokasaṃvṛtisatya or the “worldly truth of verbal convention”, *Avalokitavrata turns to interpret the concept paramārtha, or “the ultimate object (/purpose).” He engages in two etymological analyses of the compound: as Karmadhāraya and as Tatpuruṣa. He calls both the ultimate truth in the ultimate sense (pāramārthikaṃ paramārthasatyam). *Avalokitavrata then proceeds to explain as follows the three kinds of ultimate truth in the conventional sense (sāṃketikaṃ paramārthasatyam). (Sentences in bold are quotations from Bhaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa).
Now, the characteristics of the ultimate [truth] in the conventional sense are explained. The [paramārtha] also designates [1] non-conceptual knowledge whose object is paramārtha, [2] the teaching of the cessation (*nirodha) [of sufferings], and [3] intellect (prajñā).
Among the [three conventional paramārthas], first, in order to explain [1] non-conceptual knowledge whose object is paramārtha, [Bhāviveka] says, ‘Non-conceptual knowledge whose object is the [paramārtha in the ultimate sense] is also paramārtha in the manner of having no object because it has paramārtha within.’
Among the [three conventional paramārthas], in order to explain [2] the teaching and [3] intellect, [Bhāviveka] says, ‘The teaching of non-origination, etc., which is consistent with the cessation (*nirodha) [of sufferings] and the intellect derived from learning, reflection, and meditation are also paramārtha because they are the means to realize paramārtha [in the ultimate sense] and, therefore, are correct. ’
da ni brdar btags (brtags P) pa’i don dam pa’i mtshan nyid bstan par bya ste/ de yang rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes don dam pa’i yul can dang/ de ’gog pa’i bstan pa dang shes rab la nye bar gdags so//
de la re zhig rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes don dam pa’i yul can bstan pa’i phyir/ rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes de’i yul can yang yul med pa’i tshul gyis don dam pa ste/ de la don dam pa yod pa’i phyir ro zhes bya ba smras te/….
de la ’gog pa’i bstan pa dang/ shes rab bstan pa’i phyir de ’gog pa dang rjes su mthun pa skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa dang/ thos pa dang/ bsams pa dang/ bsgoms pa las byung ba’i shes rab kyang don dam pa ste (te P)/ don dam pa rtogs pa’i thabs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa’i phyir ro zhes bya ba smras te/ (D Za 236b2-6; P Za 282b2-6) 3)
The above explanation speaks of the nature and role of intellect (prajñā) as follows: First, prajñā is described as one of the three kinds of conventional ultimate-truth (*sāṃketikaṃ paramārthasatyam). Second, just as Vasubandhu stated in the first chapter of AKBh (see the above section III), the intellect should be derived from learning, reflection, and meditation. 4 Third, the intellect as well as the teaching of non-origination, etc., are a means to realize the ultimate truth in the ultimate sense.
IV-2 TJ ad MHK 3.26
Next, let us turn to Bhavya’s explanation of the meaning of paramārtha, in which he refers to the role of intellect (prajñā) as well as to the meaning of the propositional restriction “ultimately” (paramārthataḥ). The explanation is found in TJ ad MHK 3.26 as follows:
The “artha” of [the compound] “paramārtha” means an object (/ purpose) because it is “to be known”, i.e., it means “to be investigated” and “to be understood”. The “parama” is the word meaning “ultimate (/highest)”. The compound “paramārtha” means an object that is ultimate. [= Karmadhāraya interpretation of “paramārtha”]
Or it means “the object of the ultimate”, i.e., it is the object of the ultimate because it is the object of the ultimate non-conceptual knowledge. [= Tatpuruṣa interpretation of “paramārtha”]
Or it means ‘consistent with the ultimate object’, i.e., it is consistent with the ultimate object because intellect (prajñā) consistent with the ultimate object has paramārtha within. [= Bahuvrīhi interpretation of “paramārtha”]
The [word for the propositional restriction] “ultimately” (paramārthataḥ) refers also to this [Bahuvrīhi interpretation of] paramārtha.
don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya ba ni shes par bya ba yin pa’i phyir (phyir/ P) don te/ brtag par bya ba dang go bar bya ba zhes bya (ba zhes bya om. P) ba’i tha tshig go// dam pa zhes bya ba ni mchog ces bya ba’i tshig gi sgra yin te/ don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni de don yang yin la dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa’o//
yang na dam pa’i don te (de P) rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes dam pa’i don yin pas dam pa’i don to// (/ P)
yang na don dam pa dang mthun pa ste don dam pa rtogs (rtog P) pa dang rjes su mthun pa’i shes rab la don dam pa de yod pas don dam pa dang mthun pa’o//
don dam par na zhes bya ba ni don dam pa de nyid du’ang (du’am P) don dam par ro//
(D dza 59a7-b2; P dza 63a1-4):
The above explanation of Bhavya’s is important in that the author clearly regards intellect (prajñā) as having a Bahuvrīhi meaning of paramārtha because intellect consistent with realizing the ultimate object has paramārtha within. Also noteworthy is that, following Bhavya’s commentary, it can safely be said that taking paramartha in a Bahuvrīhi sense, Bhāviveka applies the restriction “ultimately” (paramārthataḥ) to both Nāgārjuna’s and his own propositions, which means “with intellect consistent with, or leading to, the ultimate object (/ purpose)”.
From the above examination of Bhāviveka’s usage and understanding of prajñā, we can draw the following conclusion:
First, like Vasubandhu in his explanation of prajñā in the first chapter of AKBh, Bhāviveka also uses the term in relation to the two truths. They also share the same understanding of prajñā as something derived from learning, reflection, and meditation. In this respect, it may be tenable to render the concept prajñā as “intellect” (知力, 理解力), which can be deepened by learning, reflection, and meditation.
Second, unlike Vasubandhu, however, Bhāviveka stresses that the individual and universal characteristics of dharmas are to be ascertained by a discerning mind in relation not to the ultimate truth but to the conventional one.
Third, the individual and universal characteristics of dharmas are negated when they are examined with intellect (prajñā) or intelligence (dhī) based on the ultimate truth. The intellect of this level is a means to realize the ultimate object. It is in this sense that the intellect is also classified in the context of paramārtha as a Bahuvrīhi compound because the intellect (prajñā) consistent with or leading to the ultimate object has paramārtha within.
Lastly, only the ultimate intellect (/ insight) (prajñā pāramārthikī), which moves without moving into the clear sky of reality, enables us to negate the entire network of the world’s concepts.
1 This paper was read at the International Workshop on Bhāviveka and the Two Truths, Ryūoku University, May 28-29, 2016. For the translation of MHK, Chapter 3, I am indebted to Eckel [2016: 15-19]. However, any errors remain my own responsibility. Hereafter, for the text of MHK, Ch. 3, see Ejima [1980: 268-361] and Lindtner [2001: 7-48].
2 See Pradhan [1967: 2] and Ejima [1989: 2].
3 Cf. Akahane et al. [2013: 75].
4 See Saito [1999: 79].
