This paper attempts to clarify why the political term, “the 3 million square kilometers of Chinese marine territory,” formed in Chinese political discourse by close examination of Chinese domestic politics from 1980 to 1996, which the literature has not yet fully addressed. It also discusses how Chinese experts calculated the legal coherence between the term and the United Nations of Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). One finding is that then-director of the State Oceanic Agency, Ruo Yuru, who believed that China lagged behind neighboring countries in ensuring maritime rights in the multiple maritime zones China could claim under UNCLOS, proposed the term “300 million square meters of Chinese marine territory” in 1984 to obtain domestic support for maritime development policy. The term, which conflates territorial water, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf into “un-unified space” under Chinese jurisdiction, was designed to appeal broadly to Chinese domestic actors who were unfamiliar with UNCLOS and who had focused on land development rather than the sea. Although Ruo’s conception of the “300 million square meters of Chinese marine territory” maintained compliance with the legal difference between sovereignty and sovereign rights defined by UNCLOS, the term may shape the views of Chinese actors in these maritime zones who perceive it as the “sovereign territory” of China because the different maritime zones defined by UNCLOS is understood through a common emphasis on China’s jurisdiction. The other finding is the Chinese government’s careful handling of the term, including replacing the term “marine territory” with “jurisdictional water” in more authoritative sources. This suggests that the government of China and Chinese experts apparently understand that the term contradicts the legal conception laid out by UNCLOS, which differentiates between sovereignty and sovereign rights, and potentially poses diplomatic problems with neighboring maritime countries. Even after UNCLOS came into force in China in 1996, some Chinese experts criticized the nationalistic view of “marine territory” as sovereign territory. However, despite careful handling of the term by the Chinese government, due to strong domestic consensus on using international law as a tool for ensuring China’s maritime rights, a nationalistic understanding of “marine territory” as “sovereign territory” has been accepted as fait accompli in China as its maritime policy develops.

Since 1988, Myanmar been subject to conflicting movements aimed at democratization and the suppression thereof, exemplified most recently by the military coup d’état of 2021. This paper considers this topic in relation to the broader international structure, in which countries such as the United States, China, and the ASEAN nations have engaged in various forms of democratization and the suppression of the same in Myanmar, giving rise to complex regional and inter­national politics.

Theoretical research on international relations has provided an excellent analysis of this international structure. In addition, area studies have produced a wealth of findings on the domestic politics and external actions of various countries; however, it can be challenging to conduct an analysis that combines theoretical research and area studies, as the two disciplines diverge considerably. This study integrates and considers findings from both disciplines as described below.

Based on theoretical research, this study identifies the characteristics of the international structure described above after the Cold War and since the latter half of the 2010s. It then confirms how that international structure has been correlated with movements to democratize Myanmar and the involvement of various countries therein. Furthermore, this study examines whether area studies may provide alternative arguments or supplement and revise the findings of theoretical research. Through this process, it may be possible to explain Myanmar’s political disturbances and the involvement of various countries as a fitting combination of international structures and domestic circumstances.

The results of this analysis will illustrate, for example, that while Myanmar pursued democratization with support from the United States and the EU in the context of international structures following the Cold War, the military of Myanmar retained its authoritarian grip and built its own hybrid regime. In addition, given the international antagonism between the United States and China, and the distance maintained by ASEAN nations from both countries, it will be explained how these countries are reducing their involvement in Myanmar as political chaos continues following the coup. This study also clarifies how ASEAN functions as a buffer between the inter­national structure and Asian countries.

The changes in Myanmar’s political regime, from the transition to civilian rule in 2011 to the post-coup period after 1st February 2021, can be divided into three stages: first, the transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another; second, the progress of democratization; and finally, the re-authoritarianization through a coup d’état and coercive suppression. However, these transitions have also led to unintended consequences. This paper focuses on the interplay and discrepancies between domestic politics and the international political economy, coincidental timing, political trade-offs, institutional design errors, and miscalculations by involved parties, which are often overlooked in a clearcut and linear understanding of political development. The main points of each section are as follows:

First, the transition to civilian rule was driven by coincidental timing and the impunity of Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military. The formation of the new government in 2011 marked a tran­sition from an autocratic authoritarian regime to a more competitive authoritarian regime. The retirement of State Peace and Development Council Chairman Gen. Than Shwe and the shift to a collectively led leadership were the essence of this transition, which coincided with a change of U.S. policy toward Myanmar, leading to subsequent reforms and improved diplomatic relations. However, this development was facilitated by a trade-off with the state military’s impunity for past human rights abuses and violations of international law.

Second, the advancement of democratization can be largely attributed to inadequate institutional design. The competitive authoritarian regime, constructed during the preceding military rule, lacked sufficient institutional mechanisms necessary for its prolonged sustainability. This deficiency significantly contributed to the electoral triumph of the National League for Democracy in 2015, consequently leading to the establishment of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2016. Of particular importance is the fact that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was expected to maintain power while striking a balance between hardliners of Tatmadaw and pro-democracy forces, was weakly organized as a political party. And the ruling government’s inability to “manipulate” the electoral system and operations to win elections also contributed to the regime’s lack of durability. As a result, an unstable power-sharing arrangement was created in which the Tatmadaw, which sought to protect its own gurdianship in the constitutional order, and the democratic forces that pursue further democratization.

Third, while the coup d’état and subsequent crackdown by Tatmadaw have eliminated pro-democracy forces from the top decision-making process on one hand, such actions have been self-undermining the legitimacy and governing capacity. Tatmadaw is planning to return to the competitive authoritarian regime, but this is becoming a mission impossible, because the coincidences that occurred during the former transition in 2011 can no longer be expected, and the aftermath of the coup is not limited to power struggles among elites but has turned into violent social conflicts.

The rapid political transformation in Myanmar from the early 2010s to the present is entering a new phase due to the reactionary actions of the junta. This transformation is irreversible, and if democratization were to resume in the country, it would follow a different path than that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership.

How did China put into practice its non-interference principle before and after the 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, and how did Myanmar’s key actors perceive China’s practice? Non-interference has been one of the more important foreign policy principles in the Asia-Pacific regional order. However, China’s approaches to the non-interference principle have evolved in the twenty-first century. Moving beyond the government-to-government channel that China had upheld in its diplomacy earlier, China began taking a flexible approach to the principle to work with the government of Myanmar and its opponents, i.e., ethnic armed organizations. In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, too, China’s non-interference policy has been questioned by many, particularly those concerned about China’s “neo-colonial policy” and its alleged “debt trap” diplomacy.

However, the meaning of the principle remains ambiguous within academic and policy communities, as the principle is often evaluated politically and subjectively in reality. By addressing the ambiguity, this paper examines China’s actual political and economic practices of what seems to be interventionist behaviour—China’s conflict mediation in Myanmar and the Belt and Road Initiative—and the Myanmarese actors’ perceptions of the practices.

This paper employs as its conceptual framework a spectrum of interference consisting of coercion on the one hand and influence on the other. Primarily based on the author’s interviews with key actors in Myanmar in 2018, this paper uses the spectrum to examine China’s practices and the Myanmarese actors’ perceptions of those practices, to determine the extent to which they amount to coercion or influence.

This paper finds that China’s political and economic practices in Myanmar and the Myan­marese actors’ perceptions address opposite ends of the spectrum. China’s practices amount to the exertion of influence on both the government of Myanmar and on the ethnic armed organizations, without resorting to coercing either actor to engage in particular behaviour. In contrast, the Myanmarese actors perceive China’s practices as nothing less than coercion and the violation of Myanmarese sovereignty. Those perceptions are linked to anti-China sentiment, wide-spread demonstrations and physical attacks against Chinese infrastructures in Myanmar, which limit the scope of China’s attempt to expand its economic influence in that country. If one takes the view that the establishment of a new regional order has to be endorsed by regional countries, the above finding implies that China’s approach to its non-interference principle suggests that China still has a long way to go to reformulate the regional order.

Since the coup d’état in Myanmar in February, 2021, ASEAN has been engaged in the political crisis. In April, 2021, the Five Point Consensus (5PC) was agreed on by its member states including the military leader in Myanmar. The 5PC calls for immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, mediation by a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair, humanitarian assistance, and a visit of the special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. ASEAN has been engaging in Myanmar’s domestic politics since its entry into ASEAN in 1997. Literatures provide conflicting views on how its engagement is related to its non-interference principle and has paid little attention to its changing nature. It argues that its engagement after 2021 changed from previous involvement, in that it has more concrete actions including more commitment by the ASEAN Chair. This change was facilitated by institutional development on conflict management starting around 2008 when the ASEAN Charter came into force. Its consequences include decision making without explicit consent of Myanmar, which could be a deviation from the non-interference principle and decision by consensus. On the other hand, ASEAN has faced difficulties in operationalizing its institution on conflict management to enable concrete actions agreed in the 5PC due to conflicting interests among the member states. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have taken a tough stance against the military government, calling for dialogue with Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and the release of detainees, while Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have called for an end to violence and political stability only, indicating a conciliatory attitude toward the military government in Myanmar. The anti- and pro-military regime conflict could hinder prompt implementation of the 5PC.

Myanmar’s coup in 2021 surfaced India’s long-time challenge of democracy assistance in Myanmar. Resurgent debate on democratic value versus geopolitical interest as guiding principle for Myanmar policy has its origin in 1988 transition. India sided with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic leaders but turned to “two track policy” around 1993. Since then, phased engagement with military government evolved while uneasily searching for new format of democracy assistance.

China’s expanding influence in Myanmar is often cited as India’s main geopolitical interest. However, India’s interest has been shifting over time, so it is too simplistic to see China factor as constantly dominant. This paper traces changes in weight and format of India’s democracy assistance. It focuses on geopolitical interest pertaining to land border, firstly necessity of border control and consequent importance of cooperation from Myanmar’s military regime, and secondly, land connectivity which Myanmar provides as gateway to ASEAN.

Myanmar’s place in India’s “Look East” and later “Act East” is quite interesting. India's vision for its Northeastern area development was tied to its neighbor. Connecting Northeast to ASEAN through Myanmar was the key to its Look East policy. Thus, engaging military government of Myanmar became legitimate as a part of ASEAN connectivity. India’s diplomacy under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized democratic value than ever as India started to identify itself as rising “democracy.” The feature of India’s democracy assistance debate then was that democratic transition was presented as the mean for economic development. Also, democracy assistance was thought to be best done through building institution.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced “Act East” policy at East Asia Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw in 2014. Under the Act East, India prioritized Bangladesh and Myanmar as recipients of capacity building. We can observe that India set to compete with China at this stage. Capacity building is a convenient policy tool which includes building education centers such as IIT and transferring submarine to Myanmar navy. India also supplied Covid-19 vaccine to Myanmar as humanitarian assistance.

Regarding democratic value versus geopolitical interest, the real test for India is Rohingya crisis. Refugee and migrant in the Northeast is problematic as it has ramifications on citizenship issue. India changed its tolerant policy in 2017 and defined Rohingya as “illegal migrants.” Instead of extending asylum in India, India provided humanitarian assistance to Rohingya in Bangladesh as well as in Rakhine state.