During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established Anti-Japanese bases and launched mass mobilization campaigns to rally the populace. One of these campaigns was the Labor Hero Movement, modeled after the Soviet Union’s Stakhanovite movement. Initiated in 1939 through the People’s Production Encouragement Ordinance, the movement recognized individuals with outstanding contributions and became an integral part of the production campaign from 1943 onwards. Previous studies have often analyzed this movement without distinguishing between the agricultural and industrial sectors, with most focusing predominantly on the agricultural sector. Few studies of the Labor Hero Movement in the industrial sector have focused on the Zhao Zhankui Movement in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. However, in contrast to the agricultural sector, where labor heroes were individual farmers, the industrial sector’s Labor Hero Movement was centered on public factories. Consequently, the methods of conducting the movement and the incentive mechanisms in these two sectors are likely to have been different. Additionally, unlike the more stable Shaan-Gan-Ning region, frontline bases like the Jinxibei and Taihang base areas were frequently under Japanese attack, which influenced both the methods and incentives of the movement. This study aims to compare the differences between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the movement, as well as between rear and frontline bases, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Hero Model Movements and clarify the inheritance of model worker commendation practices in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

In the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, the Zhao Zhankui Movement highlighted the labor attitude of working for the “public” (i.e., the state), prioritizing honor over material rewards and criticizing those who pursued personal gain. This movement did not consider the backgrounds of model workers during selection, although many were from poor backgrounds or were CCP members. This movement’s emphasis on self-sacrifice and political loyalty set a precedent for later practices in the PRC. In frontline bases, model workers were also recognized for technical improvements, as their labor, combined with military efforts, was crucial. Under severe military pressure, these regions prioritized the rapid production of high-quality weapons. The historical experience of integrating labor with the military force in these frontline bases influenced the PRC’s later labor commendation practices, especially during the Great Leap Forward, when both production and military preparedness were emphasized. This analysis reveals how differing sectors and conditions across regions shaped the Labor Hero Movement and its legacy in the PRC’s labor commendation practices.

The Kuomintang’s (KMT) system of governance had deviated from the system of yi-dang-zhi-guo (the Party governs the country) during the “bandit suppression campaign” period in the early 1930s, when KMT conducted encirclement operations against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s various enclaves across the country. In the provinces which were designated as “bandit suppression” zones such as Henan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangxi in the early 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek was able to consolidate his own political regime, though it was not based on the supreme principle of yi-dang-zhi-guo. This aspect was clearly manifested when one attempts to define the relationship between the Party organ and the government organization: in the “bandit suppression” zones, a peculiar and close-knitted party-government relationship emerged where both the Party organs and government organizations were subordinate to military institutions such as “Bandit Suppression Headquarters”. Consequently, the Party organizational efforts in the “bandit suppression” areas were costly to their financial resources, thus resulting in the decrease in the number of Party members, while the “Political Study Clique (zhengxuexi),” a bureaucratic clique, expanded its influence in local government organizations. These trends were nothing but a deviation from the principle of party-ruling regime and it indicates that an alternative system of governance in the regime had already been established before the Sino-Japanese War.