This paper deals with the influence of Othmar Spann, a Viennese professor of economics and sociology during the interwar period, on the development of Hayek's ideas. Spann was an examiner of Hayek when he obtained his Ph. D. in Political Science, and Hayek was a regular member of the Spann circle. Moreover, there is, at least on the surface, a similarity between Hayek's core theory of the Spontaneous Order developed mainly after the 1960s and Spann's Universalism.
Hayek avoided mentioning Spann after the 1930s. However, in this article, we propose the hypothesis that Hayek never forgot Spann's arguments yet always maintained some distance from him. Hayek developed the theory of Spontaneous Order as an idea based on methodological individualism from the 1940s to the 1960s. However, some recent studies have pointed out the conflict between methodological individualism and holism in The Fatal Conceit (1988). Moreover, it is pointed out that his argument in later years has a holistic or institutional character compared with Friedman or Rothbard because he develops his assertion on the basis of the theory of Spontaneous Order. If we can accept this and the fact that our society largely depends on spontaneous order, there is a possibility that the problem of totalitarianism still remains. In this sense, the relationship between Hayek and Spann is one of the current issues in political economy.
Hayek was always cautious about the confusion between his arguments and the assertion of conservatism, and we can say the same thing about Hayek and Spann's arguments. This fact suggests that analysis of the similarity and difference between the arguments of Hayek, which are one of the most important streams of modern liberalism, and those of Spann, is important from the viewpoint not only of the historical studies of social science but also in modern political science.
In this article, we consider this hypothesis in three stages. First, we outline Spann's Universalism and Hayek's conception of the individualism. Second, we consider the influence of Spann on Hayek's doctoral dissertation. His dissertation deals with the Imputation Theory and the first half discusses the problem proposed by Spann. Third, we analyse the structural similarity between the arguments of Hayek after the 1970s and those of Spann. This similarity can be clarified in the light of evolutionism and relativeness.

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In the late 1910s, John Maurice Clark insisted that traditional economics (value economics and price economics) was becoming irrelevant to the problems of “an era of social readjustment, ” advocating the need for another type of economic theory which he called “social economics.” This conception of social economics had a place in the basis of his economic thought, and core ideas of his works in the interwar periods, such as Studies in the Economic of Overhead Cost (1923) or Social Control of Business (1926), were corollaries of the fundamentals of his social economics.
In this paper, we scrutinize the original plan of John Maurice Clark's social economics logically and historically, and clarify its nature and relevant historical contexts, especially its relationship with the institutionalism movements and the implication of Clark's discussions with Anderson, Jr. on the meaning of social value in economic theory.
First, we consider why Clark advocated that social economics must become a centerpiece of economics. This was derived from his relative view of the nature of economic theory, which, he thought, had to reflect dynamic social and economic changes. This is why price economics which was based on static premises and whose materials were selected with reference to a logical “closed system” were irrelevant to problems in an era of reconstruction after the World War I. He claimed that it must become a subordinate part of economics.
Secondly, we examine the framework of Clark's social economics which he described as “non-Euclidean.” Clarifying the premises of traditional economics, he presented relevant premises of social economics, such as a concept of wealth as “inappropriables, ” a need for qualitative standards of economic activity, a universal nature of overhead cost, a problem of mechanization, and so on. He proposed that these aspects of social economics reflected the context of that time, such as an appearance of Big Business Systems, and the experience of the World War I.
Finally, we examine the backgrounds of Clark's advocacy of social economics, placing it in the context of the American economic thought of the time. We clarified its connection with the emergence of institutionalism movements led by Hamilton and other young economists, and with the controversy regarding the concept of social value. On the one hand, Hamilton's critical judgment for traditional economics and claim for institutional economics took the same approach as Clark's social economics. Therefore they had become representatives of institutionalists in the interwar period. On the other hand, by examining Clark's discussions with Anderson Jr., we recognize that they shared same context of the discussion of social value, started from John Bates Clark's Philosophy of Wealth (1885). This seems to be one of the main sources of J. M. Clark's emphasis on the need for a social value standard which implied a valuation not based on actual market prices.

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The third report in the present series, this paper offers an analysis of important recent studies (from 1980 to the present) of Japanese economic policy and thought in the 1910's and 20's.
The economy of Japan following WWI can be described particularly in terms of its emphases on scientific development and industrial production. However, this progress in industrial development led to the appearance of a widened gap between rich and poor, and one of the major issues concerning the economic thought of the time was how to improve the lot of the poorer levels of society, including workers, farmers and city dwellers.
Research in the field of economics during the 1910's and 20's had as one of its focal points the attempt to alleviate this exaggerated difference between the haves and havenots. The economics of the Association for the Study of Social Policy attempted to reduce the gap between rich and poor through the implementation at a national level of specific social policies. The ineffectiveness of these policies, however, resulted in a lack of faith in the ability of the Association to do anything about the situation in a concrete way.
The crumbling of the economic policies associated with this Association for the Study of Social Policy allowed for the appearance new approaches, such as the Neoclassical economics of Tokuzo Fukuda and the Marxist economics of Hajime Kawakami.
The present study introduces the work of Kanae Iida and Kanji Kobayashi. Seeking an approach to the study of economics based on firmly-grounded economic theories, this paper presents and comments on the work of Kanae Iida, Mikio Nishioka, Takutoshi Inoue, Tamotsu Nishizawa, Hideomi Tanaka, who themselves each analyzed the ideas of Tokuzo Fukuda. It also introduces and comments on the work of Shiro Sugihara, who investigated the thought of Hajime Kawakami.
This paper also presents the research of Kunio Yanagita, and comments on the ideas of Yoshiteru Iwamoto and Takashi Fujii, with a particular emphasis on the idea that a suitable ethical policy is critical to the success of any given economic policy.
Finally, this paper reports a decline, dating from the 1980's to the present day, in the number of studies of particular economic questions and problems, accompanied by a corresponding increase in research on historical individuals. However, it suggests that the work of Aiko Ikeo and others seems to be slowly bringing about a return to a question-centered focus.

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In 1998, the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the Communist Manifesto was celebrated in many “developed” countries. An international conference was held in Paris in May, several new editions of the Communist Manifesto were published, and many journals published special issues. Since then, various Marx readers, and several Marx dictionaries and many books on Marx have been published. Marx-studies seem to be renewed.
Readings of Marx change with changing historical and political contexts. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the “actually existing socialism” has already had profound consequences in the world of ideas and in global politics. Many authors discuss Marx “after the fall of communism, ” “for a post-acommunist era, ” or “après les marxismes.” Marx is no longer necessarily the theorist of proletarian revolution. Rather he is now widely considered as a democrat against liberalism, or as the premier critical theorist of capitalist society.
One of the focuses in contemporary Marx-studies is the relation between Hegel and Marx. While Althusserian Marxists and “Postmodernists” reject Hegelian inheritance in Marx, Hegelian Marxists insist the continuity between Hegel and Marx. While the former argues that Marx criticized Hegelian liberalism, the latter insists that Hegel was democratic as well as Marx. They, however, agree with each other that Marx was a democrat.
Another focus is Marx's approach to ecology. While some argue that Marx was in favor of the human domination of nature, others insist that Marx's approach to nature, especially his concept of the metabolism between nature and society, provides original and useful insights into the environmental crisis under capitalism. Capitalism exploits not only human nature as labor power, but also nature itself as resources. As opposed to some ecologists' critiques, Marx aimed to abolish the alienation of labor and nature entirely. Red and Green can still go together.
There have always been multiple Marxes, and each one is a product of a reading strategy. As there were multiple Marxes, so there were multiple debates. Re-reading and re-assessing Marx is itself an important way of thinking and doing, but is also a way of reconstructing a Marx at the same time. So we may not forget, as Terrell Carver says, that Marx is plural for us because our problems are plural.

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