This article aims to examine the US-Japan negotiation process over the reversion of Okinawa in the context of US strategy in East Asia.
In November, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard M. Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. This was a highly significant agreement because it settled a war-related issue between Japan and the United States, and thus contributed to the stabilization of the US-Japan alliance. The existing literature has focused on the US-Japan bilateral negotiation process and has tended to emphasize that the US government had achieved a greater level of burden-sharing with Japan thorough the negotiations. Recently, due to the declassification of numerous documents by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, researchers have begun to explore the policy-making process in the Government of Japan.
The reversion of Okinawa was not only a US-Japan bilateral issue, but also had implications for the region due to the fact that the US bases in Okinawa have played important roles in both the defense of Japan and regional security in East Asia. Furthermore, during that period, the Nixon administration reviewed the global strategy of the United States due to various international difficulties such as the ongoing war in Vietnam, Soviet military expansion, and the rapid economic rise of Japan. Therefore, the Nixon administration sought the détente with the Soviet Union, the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the application of the Nixon Doctrine. Despite these facts suggesting the significance of paying attention to the international context, previous works have not analyzed how the process of the reversion of Okinawa was related to the US strategy in East Asia.
This article reexamines the reversion of Okinawa by focusing on the US strategy in East Asia during the period from the Johnson administration to the Nixon administration, particularly the policies toward the PRC and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Analyzing documents on US policies toward PRC and ROK as well Japan, this article extends the scope of its analysis from the US-Japan bilateral relations to the international relations in East Asia.
This article argues that the US government regarded the agreement of the reversion of Okinawa as an essential step toward reconstruction of her strategy in East Asia, such as the rapprochement with PRC and the reduction of the US military presence in ROK. The US government sought to readjust the US-Japan alliance by settling the reversion of Okinawa since the US placed great value on the US-Japan alliance and also wanted to prevent Japan from pursuing more independent policies such as the development of her own nuclear weapon and to promote Japan’s burden-sharing. In addition to that, the US government succeeded in maintaining her credibility toward her allies by preserving bases in Okinawa. In other words, for the US government, maintaining the US-Japan alliance and preserving bases in Okinawa was an essential prerequisite for her strategy in East Asia. Therefore, the reversion of Okinawa not only settled a war-related issue among the US and Japan, but can also be interpreted as the beginning of the transformation of the international order in East Asia initiated by the US government.
International cooperation in the health field currently faces various problems such as the spread of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. Such problems have a long history. During the interwar period, which is covered by this paper, the League of Nations (LN) was established to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. International cooperation in the health field was one of the LN’s leading activities. It established the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), which played a central role in the LN’s activities in the health sector.
This paper analyzes the constituent instruments of the LNHO, such as its stipulated organizational objects, functions, and programs, and seeks to reveal the relationship between successful activities in the health field and the international regime. This paper also examines the characteristics of the LNHO and how these were formed and developed. A significant contribution of this paper is that it ascertains the process of the organizational formation of the LNHO from the perspective of international institutional factors, and brings out connections between progress in international cooperation in the field of health and that in international relations, in the interwar period.
The first section of the paper establishes the constituent instruments of the LNHO and clarifies the characteristics of its organizational structure. The second section reviews the organizations in the field of health before the Great War. It also examines when and how Articles 23(f) and 25 were incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations and the influence of the influenza pandemic of 1918–19 on this. The third section looks at the creation of the initial concept of the LNHO. The fourth section examines the problems associated with a change in the president of the United States from Wilson to Harding at the time the LNHO was in the process of becoming a permanent organ of the LN.
The paper concludes that even though the LNHO was a special agency of the LN, it had a unique structure that went beyond the framework of LN membership. This structure facilitated international cooperation in the health field. Compared to the political area of the LN’s work, where its purpose was to maintain peace, the promotion of international cooperation in health was easier because it was non-political. Therefore, the evolving international cooperation in the health field in the interwar period was due both to the nature of cooperation in the field and the LNHO’s structural framework that went beyond the membership of the LN. This paper emphasizes that the existence of such an international system benefited actors beyond those involved in international cooperation activities.
The Japanese claims against South Korea provoked an intense legal debate at the first Japan-South Korea negotiations and have resulted in the most contentious issue during the early phase of the bilateral normalization talks in the 1950s. Some previous studies on the Japan-South Korea talks pointed out that there was a period which could be regarded as a gap between the talks, namely between the 1950s, when the Japanese claims against South Korea escalated tension among two countries and brought the talks to a halt, and the 1960s, when the actual negotiation started moving with regard to what and how much the Japanese were going to claim. Other scholars have discussed what may have been the Japanese hidden purpose for the claims against South Korea whereby they sought to reduce the amount of the compensation payable to South Korea as well as to use it as “material for negations” in order to respond to the claims of the Japanese citizens repatriated from the formerly occupied territories. In addition, these claims of Japan to South Korea have been under severe criticism to defend the opinions that Japan had not sufficiently reflected on its control over the Korean Peninsula before and during the war.
These previous studies, however, have not revealed the legal logic which supported the Japanese government’s claims against South Korea. In fact,most of the literature pointed out that the Japanese government lacked a logical policy, causing a misconception that the Japanese government was consistently adopting a passive attitude toward the talks. Moreover, the studies tend to conclude that the effect of interference of the US and the Japanese politicians’ perception towards South Korea were the causes of Japan’s change in its policy leading to the waiver of the right to claim against South Korea during the break period and to its settlement in 1965.
This study aims to clarify what was the logic of the Japanese claims against South Korea and how it was formed. For this purpose, it focuses on the report written by Professor Yasuo Yamashita, a Law Professor at Nagoya University and a prominent international jurist, which was made before the Japan-South Korea negotiations at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report has played a significant role as a basis for the Japanese legal logic. This paper empirically analyses the main issue of Professor Yamashita’s logic and the background of his argument in his report. On the basis of this analysis, this study argues that Japan had a concrete vision and strategy with regard to its negotiations with South Korea from the beginning. Contrary to the previous literature, the findings of this paper identify the existence of consistent policy logic on the part of the Japanese government throughout its negotiations with South Korea and this logic had its origin in the formulation of its claim against South Korea.
It is often assumed that, even if opposition parties can participate in electoral politics, they are fragmented, insufficient and insignificant under authoritarian regimes in which the ruling elites have maintained their political power for the long term. Recently, however, there have been not a few pre-electoral coalitions in various countries in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Post-Communist World and the Middle East that opposition parties have formed with each other during the parliamentary elections. Under what conditions do opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty authoritarian regimes?
There are still a few studies on pre-electoral coalitions under authoritarian regimes, though even such arguments have not consider a possibility that opposition parties could form them not only in competitive context but also in hegemonic one: In other words, these studies have treated a degree of party competitiveness as a given condition and dismissed a question of how it affects coalition formation among opposition parties. Therefore, this article focuses on party competition and electoral institutions, and attempts to testify their effects on the pre-electoral coalitions formed by the leading opposition parties by using an original data of the parliamentary elections from 1961 to 2008 in multiparty authoritarian regimes in which ruling elites have maintained their political power for more than a decade.
The first section outlines it as a background of pre-electoral coalition formation of opposition parties that the number of authoritarian regimes which adopted a multiparty system has dramatically increased since the 1990s. Although compelling to adopt a multiparty system as a part of political liberalization, ruling parties have still tended to maintain their economic, social and political dominance and the opposition parties have tended to be in a disadvantageous position: It is authoritarian single-party dominance.
The second section provides four hypotheses of pre-electoral coalitions focused on the party competition and the electoral institutions on the basis of two contrasting logics derived from the analyses of authoritarian regimes:One is that multiparty elections can facilitate their political liberalization, and another is that they can foster their political stability.
The third section testifies several models with a large-N logistic regression with a sample of 248 parliamentary elections in 54 countries in the period 1961-2008. These models show that the leading opposition party is more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties when (1) the opposition parties as a whole have more seat share and when (2) the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (ENOP) increase, but that it is less likely to do it when (3) the numbers of the interaction term of seat share and ENOP increase and when (4) the plurality voting system is adopted. Finally, this article concludes by emphasizing that political institutions matter in authoritarian regimes.
Despite French President Charles de Gaulle’s harsh criticism of the American war in Vietnam since 1963, Paris was chosen as the venue for the peace talks between the US and North Vietnam, which finally started in the spring of 1968. Indeed, the US had developed a profound distrust of de Gaulle’s diplomacy, especially with regard to the Vietnam War, and a series of disputes had arisen between the two countries. Why, then, did the US accept Paris as host of the delicate peace negotiations?
In order to answer that question, this article sheds light on the Quai d’Orsay’s role in French diplomacy toward all of Indochina (the two Vietnams, Cambodia and Laos). Before de Gaulle’s first intervention in this policy area in the summer of 1963, the Quai d’Orsay had played a dominant role in peace diplomacy in war-torn Indochina. Its main goal was to protect France’s interests and influence in the region, especially in South Vietnam. To achieve this goal, it was essential to maintain Franco-American cooperation, which had gradually been established in this region after France’s withdrawal in 1954. On the other hand, de Gaulle had very little interest in these “insignificant” local interests, and used Indochina as just as one of the platforms for his worldwide strategy for “grandeur française” and a more equal partnership with the US. That is, the Quai d’Orsay’s Indochinese policy objectives were radically different from those of the President, and were in fact often seriously hampered by de Gaulle’s initiatives. This article will examine how the Quai d’Orsay’s diplomacy intertwined with the President’s to form what we used to see as “France’s policy” toward Indochina.
Based on French archival materials, the article describes the development of the Quai d’Orsay’s regional policy, then the President’s initiatives, designed to serve his global strategy. The Quai d’Orsay took an apparently “neocolonialist” stance, seeking to preserve France’s historical and privileged relations with Indochina, as it did with Black Africa, while maintaining Franco-American cooperation. In contrast, in spite of American opposition,the French President proposed a scheme of “Neutralization” for the entire Indochinese Peninsula, including Vietnam, and ardently praised nationalist movements in the Third World, expressing his support for the independence of each nation in Indochina.
Given these fundamental differences, why were there no apparent contradictions and fluctuations in French Indochinese policy during this period? This article’s analysis shows, first, that, despite all their divergences, the French President and the Quai d’Orsay shared a commitment to the key concept of “Neutralization”; the vagueness of this term allowed them to make successive and substantive policy shifts without any visible disruptions. Second, the French President could count on the Director of Asia-Oceania, Etienne Manac’h, for policy coordination in this area. The experienced professional diplomat was a convinced socialist, but he turned out to be a most faithful executor of de Gaulle’s world strategy in the region, managing to impose de Gaulle’s policy on reluctant diplomats both in Paris and in the field,specifically in the Indochinese Peninsula.
Constructivist scholarship has contended that social norms constitute appropriate state policy. Given this premise, nevertheless, because there are various norms within a society, it is conceivable that some of them are mutually incompatible and hence will clash with each other on occasions. How do state decision makers react when they are confronted simultaneously by contrasting norms? This paper investigates this question through analysis of Germany’s involvement in the war in Bosnia, wherein policy was influenced by three different normative claims: to address the humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans; to refrain from the use of force; and to maintain international cooperation with its European partners in their joint military operations. In other words, it was exposed to a “clash of norms” emanating from humanitarianism, anti-militarism and multilateralism.
This paper argues that the clash of norms propels state leaders to develop international organizations as the existence of well-developed international mechanisms for effective crisis management enables contingencies to be dealt with swiftly: before the situation deteriorates and before norms clash each other. Specifically, this argument is examined by analyzing why the German decision makers, in the light of their experience with Bosnia, came to argue for the reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of addressing “foreign” contingencies, despite the neorealist prediction of its dissolution after the demise of the Soviet Union.
The theoretical implications of this paper are discussed against the backdrop of the constructivist studies. The conventional knowledge of constructivism tells us that a new state preference, as well as a new appropriate posture of an international organization, is formed as a certain norm becomes dominant and diffused among decision makers. Thus, “changes” in state policy hinge on the “changes” in normative contexts. Meanwhile, the paper proffers an alternative perspective that because various norms are working simultaneously, state leaders (re)create international organizations so that they can avoid the conflict of norms and live up to different normative claims. Germany, in its response to the situation in Bosnia, deemed it appropriate not only to halt the violence on humanitarian grounds, but also to maintain its foreign policy stance of anti-militarism and multilateralism. That is to say, because the abiding norms remain “unchanged”, they reconstitute the structures of international organizations, as discussions of reforms to NATO within the German decision making circle were informed by this crisis. This paper is intended to advance constructivist understandings on the development of international institutions.
The impact of 9/11 was strong enough to change the Swedish security doctrine of neutrality that had existed since the Cold War. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that the security policy of 1992, that is “Military non-alliance making it possible to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in the vicinity”, had served well. This means that Sweden has practically abandoned its neutrality, confronting international terrorism.
Swedish society, generally known as ‘an open society’, has many internal “security holes” and the terrorist incident in central Stockholm on December 11th 2010 exposed such kind of vulnerability. That incident was “home-grown” and the generous migration policy was challenged again.
This article investigates ‘the securitization of migration’ in Sweden using the analytical framework of ‘securitization’ the Copenhagen School provided. The Copenhagen School insists that ‘speech act’ by securitizing actor(s) and ‘acceptance of the audience’ are required in the process of securitization and that ‘extraordinary measures’ beyond the state’s standard political procedure will be legitimated. The first two steps mentioned above are well discussed in Sweden in earlier research (e.g. by Abiri), while the third one is still controversial. Therefore, my aim in this article is to present a crucial example of an extraordinary measure.
Indeed, the securitization of migration started to occur already in the 1990s or earlier, but a conclusive extraordinary measure was not implemented until December 2001, namely the case of repatriation of two Egyptians (Egyptenavvisningarna). In 2005 the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmännen) and the Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet) investigated this deviant case and declared that the governmental action was too optimistic and that the method of the repatriation was inappropriate. The repatriation itself has been treated as an accomplished fact in the Parliament even though the decision was adopted in irregular procedure. Therefore, this result leads us to the conclusion that the process of the securitization of migration has been fulfilled.
The Securitization of migration in Sweden is still idling and there are no signs of ‘desecuritization’ after the terrorist incident in Stockholm. Furthermore, the sequential terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 are thought-provoking and indicate that the Nordic societies have to cope with migrational issues.
China’s attitude toward the international order has received growing attention. In the field of foreign aid, the international development assistance regime is organized so that members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), international organizations such as the United Nations, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank share norms and rules of foreign aid. In general, donors are expected to follow these rules when they provide foreign assistance. This paper focuses on the interaction between China and the aid regime and examines the influence of the interaction on each other.
As a non-DAC member, China offers foreign aid without being constrained by the aid regime. Since it began in 1950, China’s foreign aid has possessed distinctive characteristics and unique practices. Advocating the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs, China has assisted authoritarian states or countries under sanctions. China opposes any conditionality but the “One China Policy” to recipient countries. Such an attitude has undermined international efforts to promote necessary reforms and enhance good governance in developing countries. In addition, China’s emphasis on pursuing mutual benefits through foreign aid has caused self-interested behavior and has invited severe criticism from the aid regime as well as from recipient countries.
Despite concerns from international society, China’s foreign aid is an integral part of today’s aid landscape. As China’s aid presence expands, the aid regime cannot help but engage with China. China’s foreign aid and the aid regime are no longer discrete; they communicate bilaterally and multilaterally. The process of interaction has influenced the aid regime significantly. For instance, the World Bank’s aid policy toward Africa has incorporated major causes of China’s successful development over the last three decades such as infrastructure building and agricultural support. Moreover, China’s presence and other emerging donors have led DAC donors to question the validity of official development assistance (ODA) as the mainstream foreign aid. This poses a major challenge to the aid regime.
Meanwhile, China has acknowledged growing international concerns over its foreign aid and has started to take concrete measures to circumvent criticism. China has also strengthened its control over Chinese firms engaging aid activities overseas and published the first white paper on foreign aid in April 2011. Despite such efforts, however, there is no full-fledged transformation of China’s foreign aid. Instead, China is likely to maintain its foreign aid program without any significant reform in the foreseeable future.
What is Japan’s grand strategy in the 21st Century and where is Japan’s diplomacy heading now? These are the questions we are often asked by international affairs specialists both inside and outside of Japan. To answer these questions, I am suggesting that the strategic and diplomatic debates conducted in the 1960s, when Japan was looking for appropriate policies, be re-examined. Japanese were looking for the answers to the following diplomatic questions: Should Japan go nuclear in the light of the fact that China succeeded in obtaining nuclear weapons? Should Japan request the government of the United States to withdraw the nuclear weapons the United States was deploying in Okinawa after the Okinawa reversion? Should Japan remain in the U.S.-Japan alliance, or should Japan take more independent course of diplomacy? What kind of diplomatic relations does Japan hope to build with a growing China?
To review the diplomatic decisions the Japanese government made as well as the diplomatic arguments conducted at that time, this article focuses on the international studies and strategic arguments made by three leading international affairs specialists who had a strong influence on Japanese international studies and on Japan’s diplomacy. These specialists are Yonosuke Nagai, Masataka Kosaka, and Kei Wakaizumi; the latter was also known as an emissary between Tokyo and Washington who served under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from 1967–1971. Although each of these specialists had different approaches to international affairs, I call them realists because they were all searching for a policy “solvent”—a word Walter Lippmann used in his U.S. Foreign Policy (1943)—for Japan, rather than looking for diplomatic goals designed by ideas or philosophy. They also share the understanding that reading the situation governments are facing and predicting the next move of their opponents are most difficult.
These specialists had basically the same answers to the questions mentioned above, even though they had some differences regarding how to realize policy goals. They said, for example, that Japan should not go nuclear; the U.S.-Japan alliance is a fundamental base for Japanese diplomacy and security; and Okinawa should be returned to Japan without the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons in Okinawa.
Compared to the diplomatic problems Japan is facing today, the diplomatic and security problems of the 1960s were more complexly related to each other. By re-examining the theoretical analyses and practical applications made by the three specialists mentioned above, this article suggests that we may be able to learn lessons from their analyses of Japanese diplomacy.
How does globalization affect political change? This article attempts to answer this question by making some extensions to the retrospective voting model. If one peruses the data, government turnover among industrialized countries seems to be on the rise presumably due to the global recession in the aftermath of the “Lehman shock.” Inspired by the recent increase in political change among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states, the article provides and tests a simple hypothesis that globalization may increase domestic political change by affecting the macroeconomic conditions of each country.
Very few studies have looked at the impact of globalization on domestic political change; therefore, the present theory builds on the retrospective voting model, which is well established and firmly verified in the American and comparative political economy literature. The retrospective voting model argues that voters punish incumbent politicians by voting against them when the economy is in adverse condition. The model implicitly assumes that “shocks” to the economy are internally derived, but this model could be extended by assuming that some adverse shocks come from abroad. If globalization increases the chances that adverse shocks from overseas affect macroeconomic conditions at home, voters may kick out incumbents with greater frequency, thereby increasing the incidence of government turnover. This hypothesis is called a “naive hypothesis” because it assumes a certain degree of naïveté on the part of voters in the sense that voters punish politicians for economic conditions which they cannot reasonably be presumed to have caused.
The article tests this hypothesis by using data from nineteen OECD member states which have been conducting free and fair elections throughout the postwar period. Government turnover is defined slightly differently under parliamentary and presidential systems. Under parliamentary systems,government turnover occurs if the head of government changes from the leader of one party to that of another party. Under presidential systems,government turnover occurs if a new president is elected (irrespective of her party). To assure robustness, two different datasets are used: one counts the number of government turnover per decade in each country, and the other dataset simply codes whether or not government turnover occurred as a result of each parliamentary or presidential election. The article finds: 1) that globalization affects both growth and inflation in a significant way; 2) that the adverse macroeconomic conditions increase the incidence of government turnover; and 3) that the net effect of globalization has been to moderately increase the incidence of government turnover among industrialized nations.