法哲学年報
Online ISSN : 2435-1075
Print ISSN : 0387-2890
イェーリングの「法学観」について
構成法学としての概念法学
高須 則行
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ジャーナル フリー

2004 年 2003 巻 p. 167-175,229

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Most of us would accept that Rudolf von Jhering converted his methodology of law from the Begriffsjurisprudenz to the Zwecksjurisprudenz around 1860. It seems reasonable to say that something changed in his mind because Jhering himself said he had made a wrong way in his method of Roman jurisprudence. However, there must be considerable doubt that his change from the Begriffsjurisprudenz to the Zwecksjurisprudenz was a complete about-face.
The purpose of this paper is to point out a consistent concept of the jurisprudence that Jhering had accepted throughout his life in spite of some change in his mind.
It is important to summarize the concepts of the Begriffsjurisprudenz because it has some different concepts, one of which Jhering was said to have criticized after his “conversion.”
We may say that jurisprudence should deduce a conclusion from a text even if it is strange to approaches. One is a ‘global justice’ approach which applies principles of liberal justice directly to an international society. The other is a particularist approach which restricts the domain of justice to nations or societies.
If strict cosmopolitanism, which claims that duties to provide aid applied to all without distinction of nationality is right, then global justice command us to help the poor. Even if it is false, moderate cosmopolitanism is compatible with the global justice. And even if particularist approach is right, particularist approch is compatible with Pogge's theory of global justice.
He suggests what he calls an institutional understanding of human right. According to this understanding, having human right means any society ought to be organized that all members have secure access to the objects of their human rights. Responsibility for a person's human rights falls on all and only those who participate with person in the same social system.
He also suggests that present global order imposes severe poverty on the poor who cannot resist this order. According to Pogge this imposition deprives them of the objects of their most basic rights and it is human rights violation. Then what we must do is to diminish the injustice of the global order through institutional reforms. We must stop thinking about world poverty in terms of helping the poor.

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