イラクにおけるイスラーム政党

―制度化と運動実践の連関と乖離―

抄録

Secularisation and Westernisation/modernisation of the 1930-40 period affected the Muslim society in the Middle East and caused two types of reaction. One is popularisation of the crisis of Islam, i.e., the spread of the consciousness of the fear for losing the existing value system. It was a rather general phenomenon in the entire Middle Eastern Muslim society. The second reaction was from the narrower community of ‘ulamā’ al-dīn, who feared the loss of their traditional position in society. This was more apparent in academic hierarchy among Shi‘i ‘ulamā’.
Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr developed his Islamic thought reflecting on these two waves. His aims were (1) to activate Islamic political movements in the framework of the modern-type of political parties (institutionalising political movement), and (2) to modernise and institutionalise marja‘īya instead of individual marja‘īya. The first aim was pursued in the context of the enlargement of the broader Islamic political activities including laymen. The second aim, on the other hand, involved regulation and systematisation of the intervention of ‘ulamā’ in politics, which had been observed in a sporadic and individual way through out the history of Shi‘i marja‘īya.
al-Da‘wa was designed to achieve both purposes. Though it was established parallel to marja‘īya and most of its founding members were from ḥawza, political circumstances forced them to withdraw from the party. Consequently, supremacy of the laymen was established in the leadership of al-Da‘wa in the 1970s, and they introduced the organisational set-up, election system and internal regulation after loss of their sole marja‘. This process led the party to the separation of political leadership from marja‘īya. We may consider the feature of al-Da‘wa as a symbol of modernity, and that it represents the ideological aspect of marja‘īya.
In contrast to political development of al-Da‘wa, other Islamic organisations such as ‘Amal and SCIRI are rather inclined to depend on social networks of marja‘īya in their activities. This is a part of the reason why they do not name themselves as a “party”; indeed for them it is rather important to enter the political sphere without using a name of “party” which carries with it imported Western images. This pattern in the Islamic movement emphases the effectiveness of the traditional network of ‘ulamā’ or sayyids based on their sacredness, nobility of origin, or salvation of the soul. It can be acknowledged as an extension of the traditional social welfare network of marja‘īya.
To conclude from what al-Da‘wa and SCIRI could achieved, it is clear that the effort to institutionalise the political party was successfully accomplished but the institutionalisation of marja‘īya is yet to be achieved. This does not mean, however, that the attempt for institutionalisation of marja‘īya has abandoned. If we believe what is reported on the assassination of Sadiq al-Sadr, there remain still some forces to proceed with the reform movements of marja‘īya inside Iraq. Shubbar suggests that the delay of political movements among Shi‘i is because of the presence of marja‘īya, and that after 40 years of experimentation with the political party idea we again see marja‘īya working as an alternative to the immobilised political parties.