インドネシアの非銀行部門に対する金融監督の脆弱性

―国有ジワスラヤ社事件にみる株価操作「サハム・ゴレン」のメカニズム―

抄録

This paper examines the case of Jiwasraya, Indonesia’s state-owned insurance company, in which some investors misappropriated its assets and manipulated share prices with the fraud money, such illegal investment being called saham goreng. While it has been suggested that macro prudence has improved in the banking sector, non-banking sectors have been left behind in the Reform after the 1998 Asian Economic Crisis and even in ongoing discussions about reorganization of policy process. Moreover, the effectiveness of micro prudence on investors’ misappropriation has not been verified. This case study on the effectivity of financial supervision in the sector reveals some fragilities in the financial supervisory system in Indonesia through analysis of saham goreng transactions based on the related courts’ decisions. Firstly, being left behind in the Reform offered Jiwasraya’s managers incentives for misappropriation. Secondly, the regulator of Financial Service Agency, or OJK, lacked the capacity to oversee the negative situation of the Jiwasraya’s finance. It could not have taken initiatives to improve the situation but just followed the auditors’ views. Thirdly, under these circumstances, business networks which spread through multiple layers of the Indonesian business world were involved in the transactions, which allowed the illegal transactions to be implemented smoothly. Thus, verification of the Reform by thorough analysis through case study is needed in the current discussion of the financial regulatory institution framework.