Decentralization of Despotic Power and Ghana’s Democratic Locus: A Historic Sketch

抄録

Ghana was unstable at independence in 1957 due to the posture of traditional rulers (hereafter, Chiefs): they resisted the structure of the state, and rivaled government by perceiving themselves as natural rulers and alternative agents of local government. Given that decentralization in such a context will devolve power to Chiefs as hostile actors, the first post-independent government dismantled the independence system of decentralization and centralized power. This strategy has left a constraining legacy on the decentralization agenda of the current Fourth Republic in terms of lax government commitment which most observers and development aid agencies judge to be the main hindrance to deepened decentralization and hence advocate for a change in government attitude. Using Mann’s notion of despotic power, this paper demonstrates that such advocacy suffers from normative universalism and thus unrealistic since due cognizance is not taken of the instrumentalist interests of government which is to attain, retain and expand power. Given this, a more realistic approach to deepening decentralization will require development aid agencies partnering with Chiefs to leverage their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to be effective agents of local government. This will compel government to partner Chiefs for fear of losing popular support if they are seen to be hostile toward traditional leader’s empowerment of localities.