製糸・養蚕地帯における金融危機の展開と日銀支店

-日銀福島支店による百七銀行の救済を事例に-

抄録

This article aims at analyzing the financial crises in the Fukushima region, especially remedy-loan dealings between the 107 Bank and the Fukushima branch of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).
Following the 1920 crisis, the BOJ branch gave relief to 107 Bank in the form of remedy loans. But it aimed at helping the silk-reeling and sericulture industries rather than the bank.
In addition, it ascribed risks to 107 by securing a guarantee from its owner-managers. By using 107, BOJ checked and screened silk-reeling and sericulture companies. Through these procedures, BOJ was able to guarantee its loan-withdrawals. In 1923, the great Kanto earthquake occurred, and the finance of Fukushima region was also damaged. Thus 107 Bank and silk-reeling and sericulture industries asked BOJ for assistance. It once again helped those same industries. But it ascribed risks to 107 and warehouse companies more stringently than in 1920.
A management crisis apparently occurred when the 1927 financial crises spread to Fukushima. BOJ was afraid of a widespread financial crisis throughout the region and helped it without avoiding risks by implementing the government compensation law to avoid the collapse of Fukushima's financial system. A feature of BOJ's assistance was high-speed remedies without screening. Thus we see how eager BOJ was to avoid 107's bankruptcy and a bank-run there, although this wish was in vain.
In looking at the 1920s financial crises and the Fukushima branch of BOJ, we note how BOJ was caught between providing assistance and maintaining its credibility. But step by step it came to believe that assistance was more important and consequently sacrificed its credibility. However, it considered loan-withdrawals important too and was eager to guarantee withdrawals to avoid a decline in its credibility-its banknotes-as much as possible.