Abstract
According to Wittgenstein's thought the groundless 'form of life', which consists of language games, can let some being belong to art. The concept of language game, at first confirmed in "Investigations", denied both the thought of the separation of language and world and the solipsism derived from a private language theory, so that it must be admitted that there is an inner relation between language and world and that language is essentially public : language, where language games are playing themselves is closely connected with the world in terms of pragmatics. Thus the language game concerning the word 'art', art-game, is situated in an art-world founded on a form of life, where some being is constantly recognized as a work of art in terms of a certain stable 'deep grammar' determining an art-game. If the stability of a 'deep grammar', though necessary, were perpetual, no artistic innovation could take place. The innovation in art, similar to those in other language games, is supposed to suddenly arise 'among' inner related language games at a deep grammatical level. But so far as we faithfully follow Wittgenstein, the following conclusion cannot help being reached : the innovation comes just from the opacity of a 'surface grammar'.
