Abstract
The writer of this essay, while he appreciates the general merit of the current sociological trend of linguistic study, is not satisfied with the perfunctory or else antipodally different ways in which linguists understand their shibboleth: Language is a social fact. This dissatisfaction impels him to a critical examination of some important theories of language expressing different sociological attitutdes. In Part I, the writer takes up the controversy between Jespersen and Bally over the Saussurean doctrine, through which he brings into relief the two fundamental viewpoints: social nominalism (Jes.) and social realism (Saus.) with Tarde and Durkheim for their respective protagonists. Criticism of these two antagonistic standpoints of sociology leads him to enunciate the essential nature of social fact. In conclusion, he appreciates Th. Geiger's position which vanquishes the subjectivism of social nominalism and the objectivism of social realism. In Part II, after a historical location of the standpoints examined above, the writer proceeds to weigh Gardiner's position--another typical standpoint of sociology--which, he points out, singularly well accords with MacIver's with its two cardinal points: the volitional theory of sociality and the dichotomy of social activity and its consequence. Gardiner (-MacIver)'s standpoint is shown to be nearer to his alleged opponent Jespersen (-Tarde)'s than to de Saussure (-Durkheim)'s. Finally, the writer detects that Gardiner's entire system, in spite of its apparent emphasis on sociology, is not so much remarkable for its sociological outlook as for its (neo-) psychological substance, from which its actual utility derives. From the ironical case of Gardiner the writer learns the possibility and utility of a broad-minded angle holding together the psychological and sociological studies of speech. And such an angle is not far to seek if one gets aware of the compatibility of Geiger's standpoint and that of present-day psychology which alike have overcome both subjectivism and objectivism in their own domains. Thus, in Part III, the writer considers it necessary to go beyond the pale of sociology, pointing out that the proper study of speech with its multiple aspects necessitates some larger angle from which one can explicate consistently its psychological, sociological and also logical aspects. In describing this angle, he appreciates the fundamental importance of the concept of field to which behaviour in general including speech stands in functional relation, and overcomes, along that line, not merely the abstractness of Sprachphilosophie but the short-sightedness of phenomenalistic linguistics whether of sociological or logical or even psychological nature that refuses to go beyond fact and cannot get even as far as fact.
