感情心理学と意識

抄録

In this article the author discusses about the locus of consciousness in psychology of emotion or experimental psychology in general. To begin with a consideration is made about “the great chain of being” to illustrate historical change of the ideas about the distance between man and animals. Some famous philosophers’ ideas are also discussed.

In the second section a few experimental studies are presented that indicate animals, such as fish or mice, feel pain. Animals may not automatically respond to a noxious stimulus, but compare some neural representations and choose the most beneficial action.

The next section treats whether an animal has real consciousness. Even though an English word “feel” predominantly indicates the subject is conscious, leading psychologists have never asserted that animals are conscious beings. In fact no one has ever succeeded in showing humans are conscious animals if everyone believe “I am conscious.” We have no evidence that inanimate things are really unconscious.

Finally two books written by famous psychologists of emotions, William James and Carol Izard, are reviewed and the conclusion is that both psychologists believe that consciousness plays a central role in emotions, but consciousness is not a secure scientific concept, contradictorily. Many psychologists and philosophers believe consciousness has no active role (epiphenomenon theory of consciousness). The author suggests that consciousness is a window to communicate with others by using a code system, i.e. language. Vygotski presented the idea in 1934, but he did not extend the idea to animals. Consciousness expresses a part of the inner state of the organism to other animals including humans, verbally or nonverbally like facial expressions of emotions.