抄録
In his dialogue On the Laws（De legibus）, Marcus Tullius Cicero（106─43 B.
C.）argues that laws should be something which, when adopted by the people,
would allow them to live happy, honorable lives. In the first part（‘Part A’）of
book 1, Cicero provides the theoretical foundation for this conception, embodied
by the Stoic cosmology. In the second part（‘Part B’）, Cicero argues for natural
justice independently of this cosmology. In both parts, the naturalness of justice
means that justice is common to all. Yet, in Part B, this point does not mean
that there is a common ideal state which only a few can correctly recognize as
justice, as it does in Part A. Rather, in Part B, all people, including bad people,
recognize the basic feature of justice: its naturalness. This change in conclusion
cannot be accounted for if, as scholars tend to believe, Part B is a mere appendix,
i. e., a repetition of Cicero’s conclusion in Part A, achieved by refuting possible
alternatives to his view.
In order to provide a reasonable explanation for this change, I intend to start
by highlighting the fact that Cicero regards the arguments in both parts as
necessary for achieving the aim of this work, i. e., the preservation of the mixed
constitution, wherein all people judge what is just or not without leaving such
judgments to the few aristocratic leaders. On this basis, I will argue that it is
necessary for Cicero to suspend the conclusion in Part A and modify it in Part
B, because Part A concludes that the naturalness of justice cannot be recognized
by all. The skeptical reservation put forward in Part A seems at first sight to
be precisely the perplexing and superficial pretense that scholars considered it
to be in the past. Yet, in fact it is necessary. Cicero needs to argue for natural
justice as he did in Part B, not A, in order to achieve the overall aim of the
work and present laws which can preserve the mixed constitution, i. e., the laws
whose justness all people can judge and adopt by their own judgment. In this
way, Cicero’s skeptical strategy enables him to evade some ideas from Greek
philosophers and unfold his political thought philosophically.
