功利と自由

スペンサー倫理学における功利主義の問題

抄録

Herbert Spencer, in his Social Statics（1851）, developed a critique of Bentham’s utilitarianism. Later, in a letter to John Stuart Mill, he stated that his own thought was in the tradition of utilitarianism. However, in The Data of Ethics（1879）, he again developed a critique of traditional utilitarianism. How, then, is utilitarianism treated in Spencer’s ethics? 　This article discusses this issue in terms of the relationship between utility and freedom. In sections 1 to 3, it will review Spencer’s attitude toward the utilitarianism of his time in Social Statics, his letters to Mill and The Data of Ethics, and from what perspective he criticized utilitarianism, and clarify the characteristics of “rational utilitarianism,” which Spencer himself advocated as his own position. Section 4 builds on the discussion in Sections 1 to 3 and clarifies the characteristics of Spencer’s utilitarianism, particularly regarding the relationship between utility and liberty, to differentiate it from the utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham. Section 5 then addresses “liberal utilitarianism,” a form of indirect utilitarianism that emphasizes the development of individuality as an important component of well-being as put forward by David Weinstein, the leading recent interpretation of Spencer’s utilitarianism. Furthermore, in Section 6, the extent to which Weinstein’s “liberal utilitarianism” is a legitimate interpretation of Spencer’s utilitarianism is examined, based on the contents of Sections 1 to 4. Finally, in Section 7, the discussion so far will show the possibilities and limitations of utilitarianism in Spencer’s ethics.