Abstract
Since the beginning, the SNP's European policy has swung between pro-and anti-Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine why this waver happened focusing on the party elite's initiatives and political context surrounding its European policy, and to make it clear what kind of influence the party's arguments on Europe has had over the party's definition of sovereignty.
The SNP's European policy started as a pro-European one after the Second World War. The policy was based on the assumption that the European integration was not federal but confederal process and it would function as a “safe-guard for small nations.”
In 1960s, political context surrounding the party's European policy changed. In the party, fundamentalists, who strive for “whole sovereignty” for Scotland, gained power. The fact that European integration progressed beyond people's prospect showed its federal dynamism to the party. In addition, Britain's accession to the European integration was approaching. Because of these changes, the SNP's assumption that the European integration was confederal came to be seen suspicious. In this situation, William Wolfe, who was the Chairman of the SNP and a fundamentalist himself, came to regard the integration process as federal one and steered the party in the direction to anti-Europe.
In 1983, the SNP returned to pro-European tenet. This is because of the elite's initiative and changes of the political context again. The party's hostility to the European integration decreased because of pragmatists, who had a more moderate attitude to Europe, taking the party's control form fundamentalists. Scotland's antagonism to Mrs. Thatcher also highlighted the importance of the EC as a substitute for British government. Furthermore, Winnie Ewing MEP showed, through her efforts to secure Scottish interests in the EP, that the EC could be a provider of socio-economic policies to maintain and improve Scottish society and economy.
In 1988, Jim Sillars, Vice-Chairman, put forward the SNP's flagship policy “Independence in Europe”, which had two aspects: carrot and stick. The benefit is to make independence more realistic option by using Europe as a framework of independence. The cost is to accept federal elements in the European integration and to abandon the concept of “whole sovereignty” in stead of accepting Scotland's accession to the EC. His attempt succeeded in the former but failed in the latter because of the fundamentalists' opposition. Thereafter, the party's executives have been in a dilemma because while “Independence without Europe” is no longer realistic, hasty redefinition of sovereignty and the European integration would bring about a split in the party. Again, SNP requires its elites' initiative to overcome this dilemma.
