The paper analyses legal implications of the Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement （Japan-EU SPA）. The analysis is carried out mainly by way of comparison with other similar SPAs that have been concluded with Korea （Korea-EU Framework Agreement 2010） and Canada （Canada-EU SPA 2016）. One of the common features of the three SPAs is that all emphasize the “shared values” between the three respective countries and the EU, including the principle of democracy, the rule of law, and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These values are made “essential elements” of each of the SPAs, serious breach of which may trigger unilateral sanctions by the other contracting party. Although the Japan-EU SPA lacks an explicit provision on such unilateral sanctions, this paper argues that the same sanctions could in fact be triggered should the necessity arise. Firstly, the Japan-EU SPA allows the other party to take “other appropriate measures outside the framework of the ［SPA］” （Art. 43（6））. Secondly, the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which was concluded in parallel with the SPA, has a general termination clause that does not limit the reasons for termination. When both agreements are applied in combination, it is possible, in practice, for either contracting party to threaten to terminate the economic tie altogether should a very grave and serious breach of the “essential elements” arise. The paper also points out the most significant aspect of the Japan-EU SPA is the institutionalization of regular dialogues between the senior officials of both parties in the form of the Joint Committee, which could decide to add new agenda for cooperation. This is a dynamic element of the SPA, although it could cause a concern over how the Joint Committee could be made accountable to the respective democratic representative institutions, the Japanese Diet and the European Parliament.

　Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement （EPA） got into force from February, 2019, and this paper examines three concerning issues, that is, the objective background of EPA, the assessment of EPA, and the implications regarding multinational enterprises （MNEs）.

　Japan-EU EPA was negotiated and agreed in the unique context of globalisation. Three features of globalisation are the expansion of international economic exchanges, the growing economic importance of national governments, and the increase of regional trade agreements. Under this unique situation, both Japan and the EU have experienced the decline in global economy, while the bilateral relationships changed from Japanese trade surplus to deficit. Furthermore, at the later stage of negotiation, anti-globalisation movement like Brexit and Trump administration accelerated the negotiation to show their co-operative attitude for global economy.

　Indeed, the EPA shows high level of liberalisation of trade and investment, but that does not guarantee the revival of Japanese and EU economies. The economic impacts of GDP growth by the EPA estimated for 10 or 15 years are not so significant. Rather, both sides emphasise the opportunities of increasing exports through the EPA, and seem to treat it as a mercantilist tool. It might well of Japan and the EU to increase their exports simultaneously through realignment of “trade diversion effects” caused by previous FTAs to “trade re-diversion”.

　The issue missed in the previous analysis of the EPA is on MNEs, although the EPA stresses the liberalisation of investment. The EU is one of the largest investors as well as recipients, while inward foreign direct investment （FDI） to Japan is much smaller. Under this asymmetrical condition, MNEs’ operations in Japan and the EU are investigated. Both Japanese and European MNEs are actively engaging the exports from, and the imports to their hosts. However, the trades with home are very much constrained. Thus, the EPA may well have limited effects for MNEs’ exports and imports, compared with those with neighbour countries. At the same time, MNEs create jobs along with sales, while the R&D activities are significant. Therefore, the increase of inward FDI along with the EPA could surely contribute economic performance of hosts, and further efforts for this purpose can be recommended.

　More than 20 years have passed since the introduction of the euro in 1999. After a relatively calm first 10 years, the euro experienced a series of crises. And now, the euro is in the midst of a COVID-19 crisis.

　The objective of the open symposium ‘Euro in the Multipolar Era: Challenges after Twenty Years’, held on the afternoon of the second day of the 41st annual conference of European Union Studies Association-Japan （EUSA-Japan）, was to gain insight into the euro’s fluctuation between excessive expectations, optimism and extreme pessimism over the past 20 years.

　In the first half of the symposium, five panellists reported their observations on the current status and challenges of the euro from different perspectives: the international role of the euro, the challenge to the dollar, responses to the Renminbi and the Libra （Sadayoshi Takaya, Kansai University）; the political and economic conditions for the survival of the eurozone （Kaoru Hoshino, Ritsumeikan University）; the evolution of the policy framework of the ECB through crises （Daisuke Karakama, Mizuho Bank）; the impact of Brexit on the European financial system, the role of London as a global financial centre in Europe （Kenichiro Yoshida, then at the Mizuho Research Institute） and the China-Russia economic relationship and its impact on the euro （Yu Hasumi, Rikkyo University）.

　In the second half of the symposium, among the issues each panellist raised and discussed, with questions from the floor, were: the importance of capital market union, policy cooperation between the UK and the EU, establishment of the Next Generation EU （NGEU） and issuance of new EU bonds and the impact of currency digitisation.

　Although it is difficult to forecast the future with certainty, in the face of the extremely high degree of uncertainty that COVID-19 has caused, we were able to deepen our understanding of the euro through discussions at this symposium and clarify the points to be noted in the future outlook.

　The existing literature on trade conflicts between Japan and the European Community （EC）/the European Union （EU） usually focuses on interest-based bargaining between Japanese and European actors. Moreover, studies on Japan-EC/EU institutional development tend to analyze long-term institutional changes from “issue-driven” relations amid trade conflicts to “issue-seeking” political and economic relations. However, few empirical studies conduct a deep analysis of the process of change in specific “issue-driven” institutions during the Japan-EC trade conflicts. Therefore, from a “micro” perspective, through a case study of the Japanese EC-level voluntary export moderation agreed in 1983, this study investigates how an “issue-driven” institution on Japanese voluntary export restraints （VERs） changed. Examining negotiations on the Japanese EC-level voluntary export moderation is important because this was a “turning point” as regards developing sectoral trade negotiations from EC Member States level to EC level.

　This paper employs theoretical concepts from ideational institutionalism as subsets of new institutionalism. The existing literature already conceptualizes VERs as a “policy idea” of “revised trade liberalism” vis-à-vis the dominant idea of trade liberalism based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT）. Considering the distinct “duality of negotiation actors” （the EC Commission and EC Member States） in Japan-EC relations, this study focuses on how Japan and the EC began to share a policy idea in relation to EC-level VERs instead of those at EC Member States level, specifically from the perspective of Japanese policy-making.

　This study concludes that, during the first part of the negotiations, the existing policy idea of EC Member States-level VERs was dominant from both the Japanese and European perspectives. As a result, the institution concerning Japanese VERs to the EC “path-dependently” continued as EC Member State-level measures. The Japanese policy-making process continued to be led by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry （MITI） with little engagement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA）. However, during the second part of the negotiations, especially after the French Measures in Poitiers in 1982, the EC Commission succeeded in spreading the policy idea of EC-level VERs inside the EC and also to the Japanese Government. Then, in the MITI-led Japanese policy-making process, MOFA “framed” the export moderation as a Japan-EC issue and engaged more actively in the process than during the first part of the negotiations. Consequently, the agreed moderation became the first institutional change regarding Japanese VERs to the EC from the EC Member States level to the EC level.

　The development of EU social policy is characterized by the introduction of new policy tools. Beginning with the application of Community-method, EU social policy has adopted Social Dialogue at the Treaty of Maastricht, and the Open Method of Coordination （OMC） with the launch of Lisbon Strategy. Why has EU social policy necessitated these new tools? Focusing on the introduction of the OMC into EU policy toolbox and on the operation of the OMC on Social Inclusion, this article attempts to shed a light on the significance of the OMC in the development of EU social policy.

　For this purpose, firstly, this article analyzes the role of institutions in the European integration process. From the viewpoint of historical institutionalism （HI）, there is often divergence between the intents behind the design of institutions and the actual operation of them. Indeed, as the case of Working Time Directive demonstrates, we can find divergence caused by EU organs’ interpretation―‘conversion’ in the term of HI―in the development of EU social policy. Thus, the development of EU social policy contains a tension between EU organs’ potential of creating divergence and Member States’ desire of controlling EU policy-making.

　Considering this tension, secondly, this article examines the intents behind the design of the European Employment Strategy （EES）, which is the original of the OMC. Exploring Member States’ Treaty proposals reveals that the opponents to the EES tried to limit the potential of conversion by detailing conditions on the EU to exercise its power. Therefore, this section argues that the institutional design of the OMC reflects Member States’ cautiousness about unintended expansion of EU competence.

　Lastly, this article reviews the OMC on Social Inclusion. In the study of the OMC, researchers have tried to measure the effects of the OMC. Instead of the measurement of effects, this section examines the expected causal mechanisms in the OMC―peer-pressure and bench-marking mechanisms―in order to clarify the actual function of the OMC. This examination shows that Member States’ control has prevailed over the European Commission’s influence in peer-review process and Member States’ discretion has expanded to the degree that they can manipulate benchmarks.

　From these analyses, this article concludes that the OMC was introduced into EU social policy as a prevention against unintended consequence, and that the Member States have consequently succeeded in enhancing the control over EU social policy-making process.

　This study focuses on the retail payments market in the European Union （EU）, which does not seem to have integrated as much as other internal markets have, despite various measures taken since the 2000s. This research assesses these measures to shed light on the progress and challenges of the EU’s retail payment market integration. Through a framework of quantitative and price indicators, the study analyses the extent of integration of the EU retail payments market.

　The paper begins with an overview of retail payments and the differences among EU countries in their use characteristics, including those of online and mobile payments popularised by the spread of internet and smartphones. Second, two important measures of EU retail payments market integration are surveyed: the Single Euro Payments Area （SEPA）, which offers a single scheme and infrastructure for banking credit transfer and direct debit in euro in the single currency area or Eurozone; and the EU single retail payments service market, which enables firms to provide payment services across borders through a single passport within the EU.

　Finally, the study examines how the EU’s retail payments market has been integrated, using a framework including factors such as development of market participants （e.g., the number of payment institutions and the rate of passporting in EU member states）, and convergence to lower price levels within the EU （e.g., in banking credit transfer fee and interchange fee for card payments in EU member states）. The analysis finds that more payment institutions are providing their services across borders, with fees gradually converging to low levels, proving that the EU retail payments market has progressed towards higher integration since the 2010s.

　Additionally, the study finds that the diverse retail payment behaviours in EU countries have started to converge in the form of secondary benefits from market integration. It has been argued that the use of retail payment instruments in EU countries varies greatly according to history, law, culture, and customs. This study contends that the secondary benefit of market integration is seen in the changes in retail payments usage, especially in the increased cross-border provision of payment services, market acceptance of card, online, and mobile payments, and fall in retail prices.

　The purpose of this paper is to analyse and discuss the role of transnational networks in European economic integration in the 1950s. Contemporary historians of European economic integration have largely ignored the transnational dimension of the history of European integration. However pro-European transnational pressure groups have played a crucial role in the European integration process. In order to understand these groups, this paper explores the following archives: The Archives of the European Movement from the European University Institute, the Archives de la Ligue Européenne de Coopération Économique and Papiers Paul van Zeeland.

　Several active pro-European transnational groups set up the <i>Joint International Committee of the Movements for European Unity</i> on 14 December 1947. This Committee organised the Congress of Europe in The Hague in June 1948 and adopted the name, ‘The European Movement’ in October 1948. At the Hague Congress, The European League for Economic Cooperation （ELEC） largely determined the course of the Congress’s discussion regarding economic policy and draughted the economic resolutions of the Congress. The ELEC regarded itself as the Economic Branch of the European Movement.

　The ELEC, which continues to be an active European lobby today, was founded in 1946 by Paul van Zeeland （former prime minister of Belgium） and Joseph Retinger （former personal secretary to the Polish prime minister, Sikorski） who had both been strong partisans of trade liberalisation since the inter-war period.

　The association was a very elitist structure, from the start; it intended to remain small and not seek mass support. The ELEC wanted to exert direct pressure on decision-makers, rather than on public opinion. Members included business leaders, economists, trade unionists, and high-level politicians. Within the ELEC, there was one national section per participating country. The international institutions of the ELEC also included a central committee and a general secretariat.

　The League was more influential than other pressure groups as it focussed on technical aspects and delivered well-documented publications written by economic experts. In addition, ELEC experts had strong personal contacts with decision-makers, to whom they proposed economic solutions. Its reports and proposals were largely adopted by early European institutions and national governments in the 1950s.

　The ELEC supported a free-market economy and recognised European integration as a good means of promoting economic liberalisation and, thus, the competitiveness of European enterprises. The League’s liberal orientation took concrete shape in the form of the European Economic Community.

　The European Union is recently suffering from problems of persistently low growth as well as anti-EU and populistic movements that capitalise from the economic discontent. This paper, thus, checks for the impact of the European integration on the economic growth in the EU countries, controlling for other determinants, and differencing also between the old and new member states. First, the integration index and its sub-indices for trade in goods, trade in services, FDI, portfolio, and migration are estimated using the principal components analysis to illustrate the state of integration in the European Union and its member states. Next, we use the estimated index and sub-indices in the growth regressions to analyse their impact on growth in GDP per capita in the EU countries.

　The estimated index shows slight upward trend in years 2006-2018 indicating that the integration process in still ongoing and the sub-indices point at the fastest increase in integration in areas of trade in services and migration. The growth regressions imply that higher level of integration is associated with higher growth rates but this relationship seems to hold especially in countries that joined the EU since 2004, implying the convergence-stimulating impact of European integration. At the same time, the increase in the index has negative impact in the non-CEE countries.

　The positive impacts of integration in the CEE countries come mostly from trade in goods and services. The countries are, however, negatively affected by level of migration and change in portfolio flows. The negative impact in the old member states seems to stem from trade in services and migration. The results on migration and trade in services, together with robustness checks that show no negative impact for migration with the rest of the world, imply that free movement of labour in the EU might be unsustainable, given the existing differences in wages, labour conditions, or work opportunities across the member states. The strong negative impact of portfolio flows, with positive impact for flows with the ROW, leaves also questions on financial integration in the EU.

　The results provide thus some worrying observations on the effects of European integration, calling for further analysis of its impacts and their reasons, and for policies that would mitigate the negative effects and maximize the positive ones.