Abstract
The enlargement from 15 to 25 member countries in May 2004 is the biggest single expansion of the EU since its establishment half a century ago and poses a formidable challenge both for the institutional structure and the decision-making process of the EU itself. The Communities first and the EU afterwards have gradually moved from trade and common market goals to a convergence of principles and values that have been enshrined in the draft Constitutional Treaty prepared by the Convention on the future of Europe between February 2002 and July 2003. The Constitutional Treaty, consisting of a preamble and four main parts for a total of 465 articles, is intended to replace all the existing instruments, that is the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community as well as all the acts that have amended or supplemented them. The well-known “pillar structure” introduced by the Maastricht Treaty will also be abolished even if special procedures will continue to apply in the fields of foreign policy, security and defence. The fundamental principles governing the EU are embodied in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty which represents the “core” of the document and in a certain sense the “real” Constitution of the enlarged EU. The areas of competence of the EU are clearly described although the powers of the EU itself are not extended to a significant extent. Among the most important institutional changes of the Constitutional Treaty are the creation of a full-time post of President of the European Council, bringing to an end the current system based on six-month rotating presidencies, the appointment of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the substantial extension of the co-decision procedure to be implemented jointly by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The move from the traditional formula of “weighted voting” to “double majority”, based on the number of countries as well as on their population, has been another outstanding innovation of the document produced by the Convention. The provisions of Part II of the Constitutional Treaty give the EU its own catalogue of rights through the incorporation of the full text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in Nice in December 2000. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was unable to approve the text of the Constitutional Treaty before the end of 2003 as widely expected; however, the Irish presidency managed to have the text approved by June 2004. Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by all the 25 member countries should on no account be taken for granted and considerable challenges remain in the foreseeable future. While a permanent division within the EU between leading countries and second-rank members must be avoided, it should be possible for a “pioneer group” of countries to work harder to pursue initiatives of common interest in a number of key political, economic and security areas with the possibility for other members to join at a later stage, without compromising the prospect of a “common future” contained in the Consti.
