Abstract
The British Government under Harold Macmillan made its first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in August 1961. This application marked not only a significant turning point of Britain's post-war external policy, but also a very beginning of the enlargement process of the European Integration (“from the Six to the Twenty-five”).
In the existing studies, it has often been pointed out that the British Government's consideration about its “special relationship” with the United States, particularly its recognition that the new John F. Kennedy Administration (inaugurated in January 1961) supported the EEC and Britain's entry into it more vigorously than the previous Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, was one of the factors which facilitated the first application. However, this article, which is based on both British and American governmental records, claims that America's strong support for the European Integration of the Six and its relative coolness towards British initiative such as the European Free Trade Area (FTA) plan (the so-called Plan G) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were largely consistent throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The British Government tried hard to persuade the Americans into adopting more pro-British and pro-FTA/EFTA attitudes, but those efforts turned out to be mostly abortive. Consequently, the consistency (rather than change, as often pointed out in many existing studies) of the American attitudes facilitated Britain's policy change towards its first application to the EEC.
In the diplomatic sphere, Britain's first application to the EEC can be understood as a measure to maintain and strengthen its “special relationship” with the United States, by becoming a member and a “stabilising force” in the EEC. In the trade sphere, Britain's first application can be understood as a measure to secure an equal access to the EEC market, which was expected to be an alternative to the huge but still protective American market but (if Britain remained outside) be surrounded by relatively high common external tariffs. Therefore, it can be pointed out that Britain's first attempt to join the EEC was a primarily defensive effort to avoid the danger of being sandwiched by the United States and the EEC and seriously losing the basis of its international influence and economic power.
