Host: Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Intelligent Informatics (SOFT)
The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game has been frequently used to examine the evolution of cooperative behavior among agents in the area of evolutionary computation. A number of factors are known to be related to the evolution of cooperative behavior. One well-known factor is spatial relations among agents in a grid-world. Such a spatial IPD game has a neighborhood structure which is used for local opponent selection in the IPD game and local parent selection in genetic operations. Another important factor is the choice of a representation scheme to encode each strategy. Whereas it is known to be important, a mixture of different representation schemes has not been examined for the spatial IPD game in the literature. In this paper, we introduce the use of a mixture of different representation schemes and the use of two neighborhood structures in the IPD game. Through computational experiments, we examine the effects of these specifications to the evolution of cooperative behavior.
