Is the Particular Inferable? Dignāga’s Argument on the Inference of Wind

Abstract

In this paper I clarify the context of the entire section of Pramāṇasamuccaya 2.3cd–5ab, in which 2.5ab is found, based on Dignāga’s original intention, and clarify the course of the discussion. Finally, by referring to or reinterpreting the assertion of Vaiśeṣikasūtra 2.1.18–19, Dignāga reinterprets the assertion that the inference （strictly speaking, a combination of the words of a trustworthy person [āpta] and elimination） can convey the specific characteristic of wind as verbal testimony （inference based on the words of a trustworthy speaker）. This leads Vaiśeṣikas themselves to abandon the claim that inferences that do not rely on verbal testimony can convey the specific characteristic of wind. Moreover, Dignāga states that verbal testimony of an unobservable object （adṛṣṭa） such as wind and heaven does not communicate its specific characteristic but only its general characteristic; however, since it is based on the perception of a trustworthy person, it not only leads to conceptual cognition but functions as a genuine inference. The presentation of the conditions that a verbal testimony must meet and the distinction between Buddhist and non-Buddhist scriptures are not the primary focus within this context.