Feasibility Evaluation of an On-site Generator Network by the Cooperative Game Theory

Abstract

On-site generator, such as CGS (cogeneration system), is allegedly considered to be an effective end-use energy system in order to accomplish primary energy conservation, CO₂ emission mitigation and system cost reduction, which characteristics eventually improve the whole performance of an existing energy system for the future. Considering the drawback of installing an end-use CGS into the customer with small or middle scale floor space, however, it is difficult to achieve those distinctive features because the thermal-electricity ratio of CGS does not always be in agreement with that of customer energy demand. In order to overcome that matching deficiency, it is hence better to organize an on-site generator network based on mutual electricity and heating transmission. But focusing on some cogenerators underlying their behaviors on maximizing their own profits, this on-site network, which situation corresponds to a grand coalition, is not necessarily established because of each cogenerator’s motivation to form a partial coalition and acquire its own profit as much as possible.
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the optimal operation of an on-site generator network and identify by applying the nucleolus of the cooperative game theory the optimal benefit allocation strategy in order for the cogenerators to construct the network. Regarding the installation site of this network, the center of Tokyo area is assumed, which locational information includes floor space and so forth through a GIS (geographic information system) database. The results from the nucleolus suggest that all districts should impartially obtain the benefit from organizing network for the purpose of jointly attaining the system total cost reduction.