Interdisciplinary Information Sciences
Online ISSN : 1347-6157
Print ISSN : 1340-9050
ISSN-L : 1340-9050
Special Section for the GSIS Workshop on Game Theoretic Analyses of Social Institutions
Industrial Garbage Tax and Environmental Policy Game under a Two-Region Model
Hirofumi FUKUYAMATohru NAITO
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ジャーナル フリー

2005 年 11 巻 1 号 p. 35-48

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This study is intended to examine an efficient industrial garbage disposal system and an optimal policy to establish it. Industrial waste created in processes of all production is increasing every year. That increase is exacerbated by the shortage of disposal space, engendering frequent cases of illegal abandonment. We analyze environmental policies to restrain illegal abandonment and to establish a social optimum under the two-region model that incorporates transboundary movements of industrial garbage. Although a subsidy policy is an optimal policy in the one-region model, it is not optimal policy in the two-region model because of a subsidy-reducing game.
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© 2005 by the Graduate School of Information Sciences (GSIS), Tohoku University

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons [Attribution 4.0 International] license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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