抄録
We consider a class of games which is suggested from the timing problems
for putting some kind of farm products on the market. N players take possession of the
rights to put some kind of farm products on the market with even ratio. Each of the
n players can put the farm products at any time in [0, 1]. The price of them increases
over [0,m] ⊂ [0, 1] and decreases over (m, 1] with pass time t as long as none of the n
players takes his action, however if one of the n players put his farm products on the
market the price falls discontinuously and then fluctuates analogously as before. All
players have to put their farm products on the market within the unit interval [0, 1].
In such a situation, each player wishes to put at the optimal time which gives him the
highest price, considering opponents’ action time with each other. This model yields
us a certain class of n person non-zero sum infinite games.
